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COPYRIGHT’S MARKET GIBBERISH 
Andrew Gilden* 
Abstract: There is a growing contradiction at the core of copyright law. Although courts 
and scholars frequently assert that copyright is only about authors’ economic interests, 
copyright law routinely protects interests such as privacy, sexual autonomy, reputation, and 
psychological well-being. It just uses the language of money and markets to do so. This Article 
shows that copyright law routinely uses economic rhetoric to protect a broad range of 
noneconomic interests—a practice this Article names “market gibberish.” Market gibberish 
muddies copyright jurisprudence and has sweeping practical, conceptual, and distributive 
impacts. 
In a wide range of copyright cases, plaintiffs use economic and market-based theories to 
achieve goals that have little do with economic rights. If plaintiffs can plausibly tell a story of 
market harm, courts will often respond by manipulating economic rhetoric to provide the 
desired outcomes. For example, courts have protected celebrities’ rights to permanently 
suppress wedding photos and sex tapes, under the theory that they have the “right to change 
their mind” and someday reap profits from these materials. When courts engage in market 
gibberish, they obscure the diverse range of economic, emotional, and cultural interests at stake 
within copyright law. This Article argues that, instead of dogmatically hewing to economic 
incentives and market rhetoric, courts should engage in a more transparent examination of the 
interests actually at stake in copyright disputes. 
This Article makes three primary contributions. First, it provides the first comprehensive 
account of market gibberish and shows, through detailed analysis of case law, that litigants 
have long used market gibberish to advance their noneconomic goals. Second, it shows how 
the prevalence of market gibberish erodes copyright theory and practice. Rather than rigorously 
police market interests—as many scholars have proposed—courts should more explicitly 
engage with the diverse motivations for asserting copyright infringement. An interest-
transparent approach would shed light on the complex normative work copyright is already 
doing and better distinguish between legitimate and abusive copyright assertions. Finally, this 
Article shows how market gibberish contributes to inequality under copyright law. A plaintiff’s 
ability to tell a story about potential markets is often limited to the most powerful 
rightsholders—famous artists, celebrities, and corporate creators—and not to the wide range 
of vulnerable and lesser-known individuals who are turning to copyright to stop the viral spread 
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INTRODUCTION 
Copyright law often forces litigants to answer some very strange 
questions. For example: 
Would anyone pay to see you get attacked by an orca whale?1 
Do you plan on selling that video of you having sex with your 
best friend’s wife?2 
Do you make a living off of your own wedding photos?3 
Did you join a monastery in order to make a few bucks?4 
Will you ever really be famous?5 
If litigants can plausibly answer “yes,” then they stand a decent chance 
of establishing infringement, demonstrating sufficient “market harm” to 
defeat a fair use defense, and obtaining monetary and injunctive relief. If 
they are forced to say “no,” courts increasingly shut their doors to their 
claim, deny any form of relief, and cast their interests as beyond what 
copyright law is meant to protect. 
 
                                                     
1. Smith v. NBC Universal, No. 06 Civ. 5350 (SAS), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13280 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
22, 2008). 
2. Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (M.D. Fla. 2012). 
3. Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012). 
4. Soc’y of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2012). 
5. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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Copyright law in the United States today is typically justified by the 
need to provide authors with economic incentives to create original 
works.6 This longstanding justification for copyright, however, has in 
recent years become a doctrinal limitation. Although authors historically 
used copyright to protect nonpecuniary interests,7 contemporary courts 
and scholars now frequently insist that rightsholders can only challenge 
the use of a work if it implicates a genuine economic interest in the 
protected work.8 If, instead, what motivates a dispute is family privacy, 
sexual autonomy, reputation, or physical and psychological well-being, 
the rightsholder must look to other areas of law, even if copyright law 
provides the only realistic avenue for relief.9 Under this view, if copyright 
is meant to provide market exclusivity and to financially reward authors 
of creative works, then copyright assertions unrelated to markets and 
money accordingly have no place in the system. 
Despite courts’ and scholars’ frequent insistence that copyright is only 
about economic incentives and reward, this Article shows that other 
noneconomic interests are still quite regularly vindicated through the 
rhetoric of markets. Even if a lawsuit is rather obviously motivated by 
interests having nothing to do with economic interests, if a plaintiff can 
plausibly tell a story about market harm, they are able to vindicate a wide 
                                                     
6. See Harper & Row Pubs. v. The Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“By establishing a 
marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create 
and disseminate ideas.”); Christopher Buccafusco & David Fagundes, The Moral Psychology of 
Copyright Infringement, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2433, 2445 (2016) (“It is a familiar, even uncontroversial, 
notion among judges and scholars that American copyright law is not driven by so-called ‘moral’—
i.e., non-pecuniary—considerations.”). 
7. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198 
(1890) ( “[T]he legal doctrines relating to infractions of what is ordinarily termed the common-law 
right to intellectual and artistic property are, it is believed, but instances and applications of a general 
right to privacy, which properly understood afford a remedy for the evils under consideration.”). 
8. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015); Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 
2003); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569 
(2009); Christina Bohannan, Copyright, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969 
(2007) [hereinafter Bohannan, Copyright, Foreseeability, and Fair Use]; Christina Bohannan, 
Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1083 (2010) [hereinafter Bohannan, 
Harmless Speech]; David Fagundes, Market Harm, Market Help, and Fair Use, 17 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 359 (2014); Jeanne C. Fromer, Market Effects Bearing Upon Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 615 
(2015); Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 
112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1255 (2014); Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: 
Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1188 (2010); Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly 
Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REV. 609, 657 (2006).  
9. See, e.g., Jennifer Rothman, The Other Side of Garcia: The Right of Publicity and Copyright 
Preemption, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 441, 442 (2015) (discussing Cindy Garcia’s use of a copyright 
claim where her state publicity and privacy claims were likely barred by federal law). 
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range of noneconomic interests.10 This ability to tell a story about market 
harm, unfortunately, is often limited to the most powerful rightsholders—
famous artists, celebrities, and corporate creators—and not to the wide 
range of vulnerable and lesser-known individuals who are increasingly 
turning to copyright to stop the viral spread of their words, images, or 
voices.11 
This Article gives a name to courts’ manipulation of market rhetoric in 
order to advance noneconomic copyright interests: market gibberish. 
Market gibberish hides the true motivations behind a copyright lawsuit as 
well as courts’ resolution of the dispute, thereby masking the interests 
actually at stake in contemporary copyright law. Privacy, autonomy, 
security, family, and friendship are driving a wide range of contemporary 
copyright assertions, but there is currently almost no place within the 
dominant approaches to copyright infringement to expressly acknowledge 
those nontraditional interests.12 Accordingly, courts resort to market 
gibberish as a way to protect nontraditional copyright interests in a 
seemingly traditional way. Although courts in copyright cases—
particularly in fair use cases—increasingly recognize a broad range of 
defendants’ interests in copying as part of news reporting, scientific 
research, parody, critique, and other forms of free speech,13 these courts 
typically do not acknowledge which plaintiffs’ interests they are weighing 
against them. Within the rhetoric of fair use, it is market gibberish versus 
free speech, or it is nothing at all. 
Copyright law desperately needs an expanded vocabulary for the 
interests it serves.14 In previous work, I have shown that intellectual 
property law—largely outside of courts—plays an important role in 
resolving a broad range of social and cultural disputes that are hard to 
                                                     
10. See infra Part I. 
11. See generally Andrew Gilden, Sex, Death, and Intellectual Property, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
67, 71 (2018) (“IP can be used to address a broad range of social and emotional vulnerabilities 
associated with the viral spread of images and text.”). 
12. As discussed infra Part II, to the extent that these non-traditional assertions are protected in any 
explicit manner, it is when they are lumped into the category of “unpublished” works, alongside early 
drafts of mass publications and prepublication licensing deals, which often have little to do with 
personal privacy or social boundaries.  
13. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Use, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2008) 
(providing a taxonomy of fair uses). 
14. See, e.g., Kate O’Neill, Against Dicta: A Legal Method for Rescuing Fair Use, 89 CALIF. L. 
REV. 369, 378 (2001) (“In fair use disputes, litigants argue over central human concerns such as work, 
thought, knowledge, freedom, property, identity, or privacy by using the strangely truncated 
vocabulary of copyright.”); Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 259–60 (2006) (“To put it 
bluntly, there are no ‘giant-sized’ intellectual property theories capable of accommodating the full 
range of human values implicit in intellectual production. But there should be.”) (citations omitted). 
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square with economic incentives theory.15 This Article shows that when 
copyright disputes do result in a judicial opinion, the parties’ diverse 
motivations and implications often collapse into the homogenous rhetoric 
of market gibberish. It argues that instead of doing non-market work under 
the cover of market gibberish, courts should openly and explicitly discuss 
the range of interests they are weighing when deciding whether a given 
use is infringing. 
This interest-transparent approach would have numerous benefits. 
First, it would place rightsholders on more equal footing, regardless of 
wealth or celebrity, when they have otherwise identical motivations in 
bringing a copyright claim. Second, it would better reveal the important 
policy decisions courts are making in copyright disputes by helping to 
distinguish lawsuits motivated by truly censorial concerns—e.g., 
preventing criticism of business practices16 or squelching opposing 
political views17—from other non-traditional lawsuits—e.g. to combat 
revenge porn18—that the copyright system may legitimately wish and be 
well-suited to address. Not all noneconomic interests are—or should be—
treated equally, yet copyright has not developed a coherent way of teasing 
them apart. Third, deemphasizing market interests may help rein in 
socially suboptimal lawsuits brought by powerful actors by limiting their 
ability to harness market gibberish to market-irrelevant ends. And finally, 
a fuller airing of the actual interests at stake in copyright disputes would 
facilitate improved tailoring of infringement remedies to the nature of the 
harms alleged. Copyright remedies often wrongly conflate interests in 
compensation and control;19 an interest-transparent approach would not. 
Previous scholars have responded to uncertain, circular, or otherwise 
questionable market analyses in copyright by advocating for a more 
rigorous inquiry into actual, demonstrable market harms and benefits.20 
This Article takes a different approach. It shows that any effort to 
rigorously police market interests in copyright law will likely benefit the 
most powerful rightsholders, regardless of whether they are plaintiffs or 
defendants. Doubling down on markets might appear to claw back the 
                                                     
15. See Gilden, supra note 11 (arguing that copyright and publicity rights are effective and 
normatively-desirable legal tools for addressing disputes involving revenge porn, celebrity sex tapes, 
and mourning families). 
16. See Katz v. Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2015); Small Justice v. Xcentric Ventures, 
99 F. Supp. 3d 190 (D. Mass. 2015). 
17. See Savage v. Council on Am.-Islamic Rels., Inc., No. C 07-6076 SI, 2008 WL 2951281 (N.D. 
Cal. July 25, 2008). 
18. See Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025 (2013); Gilden, supra note 11. 
19. Mark Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 
(2007). 
20. See, e.g., infra Part II.  
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reach of copyright for the benefit of cultural participation and public 
knowledge, but it instead claws back copyright protections primarily for 
those on the market’s periphery. A resolutely market-centered approach 
to copyright does nothing to dislodge—and indeed likely fortifies—the 
cultural dominance of celebrities, corporate authors, and other powerful 
rightsholders. And in doing so, a market-centered approach comes at the 
expense of everyday copyright holders. It is time to free copyright 
jurisprudence from the stranglehold of the market and the market 
gibberish it produces. 
Part I provides the first in-depth account of market gibberish through 
an extensive survey of copyright case law. It shows decisions where courts 
refuse to redress copyright claims because the lawsuit is not motivated by 
a cognizable market interest, and then also shows decisions where courts 
vindicate nearly identical interests using the rhetoric of market harms. It 
highlights five contexts in which market gibberish has been particularly 
prevalent: sexual imagery, private documents, religious disputes, political 
opponents, and emotional distress damages. 
Part II shows the negative impact of market gibberish on copyright 
theory and practice. Numerous scholars have argued that courts need to 
double down on copyright’s market-based commitments in order to weed 
out abuse and private censorship. However, courts have increasingly 
pledged allegiance to market-based justifications for copyright, yet they 
nonetheless continue to smuggle in other justifications through market 
rhetoric. The result has been opaque reasoning and uneven access to the 
copyright system. Pulling from literature in economic sociology and 
feminist legal theory, this Article emphasizes that efforts to keep 
economic and other interests legally distinct often can result in negative 
distributive consequences along the lines of gender, race, and class. 
Given that courts are already implicitly vindicating noneconomic 
interests, copyright law would greatly benefit from a more transparent 
approach to the actual interests at stake in litigation. Part III outlines an 
interest-transparent approach, sets forth its advantages, and identifies 
some potential obstacles. Considering noneconomic interests would not 
require any statutory changes—for example, the fair use statute expressly 
refers to the “effect on the potential market or value”21 of the copyrighted 
work, and an interest-transparent approach would surface the important 
work copyright law is already doing behind the veil of market gibberish.  
                                                     
21. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (emphasis added).  
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I.   MARKET GIBBERISH IN ACTION 
 Even though a variety of natural and moral rights theories can 
support intellectual property rights,22 the U.S. legal system expressly 
embraces an economic incentives theory to justify its copyright laws.23 In 
both Eldred v. Ashcroft24 and Harper & Row v. The Nation,25 the Supreme 
Court explained that “[b]y establishing a marketable right to the use of 
one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and 
disseminate ideas.”26 The “economic philosophy”—or market-based 
rationale—of copyright is to provide authors with personal, financial gain 
as an incentive for them to create works that will benefit the broader 
society.27 Without the market exclusivity copyright provides, the concern 
is that authors would be unwilling to invest in creative activities out of 
fear that their work would be copied and consumed without 
compensation.28 Copyright accordingly solves the public goods problem 
associated with intellectual labor and allows a market for creative works 
to flourish.29 
 This market incentives theory repeatedly has been used to justify the 
expansion of copyright protections in highly criticized ways. In Eldred, 
for example, the Supreme Court justified extending the copyright term by 
twenty years as an additional incentive for authors and publishers to create 
and disseminate creative works, even though the author would be long 
dead and would be highly unlikely to change their behavior based on 
possible additional revenue for their heirs 100 years in the future.30 In 
                                                     
22. See generally ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011); Roberta R. 
Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1945, 1946 (2006). 
23. See Sunder, supra note 14, at 259 (2006) (“Unlike its cousins property law and the First 
Amendment, which bear the weight of values such as autonomy, culture, equality, and democracy, in 
the United States intellectual property is understood almost exclusively as being about incentives.”). 
24. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
25. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
26. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219; see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
558 (1985). 
27. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558 (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)) 
28. Id. at 559 (“If every volume that was in the public interest could be pirated away by a competing 
publisher . . . the public [soon] would have nothing worth reading.”) (alteration in original) (quoting Sobel, 
Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 43, 78 (1971)). 
29. Apple Comp., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (“Copyright’s 
purpose is to overcome the public goods externality resulting from the non-excludability of 
copier/free riders who do not pay the costs of creation.” (citing Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the 
Scope of Copyright Protection for Applications Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1059 (1989))). 
30. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
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Harper & Row, the Supreme Court emphasized that the right to control 
the first publication of a work was an important economic incentive for 
authors, justifying limited fair use protections for news organizations that 
use unpublished material.31 The economic incentives theory accordingly 
has come under considerable fire as both empirically questionable32 and 
as ushering in an overly broad property right that inhibits a wide range of 
socially valuable expression,33 including audience engagement with 
popular works,34 artistic modifications of such works,35 and journalistic or 
scholarly accounts of the work.36 Nonetheless, under an incentives 
framework, any of these activities could potentially provide licensing 
revenue to the copyright owner, and accordingly provide additional 
financial incentives to engage in creative activities. 
 In recent years, courts and scholars have begun to flip copyright’s 
economic incentive theory on its head. Although the economic incentives 
theory has historically served to expand copyright, courts and scholars37 
are increasingly using this theory to limit the reach of copyright and 
prevent censorship or other abuses. If a copyright owner is not motivated 
by a desire to protect their market exclusivity, or if a challenged use is 
unlikely to cause any harm to an author’s economic interests, courts will 
reject copyright liability and/or deny the copyright owner their requested 
damages or injunctive relief. 
 The most prominent example of courts using markets as a substantive 
limit on copyright is the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Garcia v. 
Google, Inc.38 In Garcia, Cindy Garcia asserted copyright infringement 
claims against Google for refusing to remove the infamous Innocence of 
Muslims video from YouTube.39 Garcia had been “bamboozled” into 
briefly performing in the blasphemous portrait of the Prophet Mohammed, 
                                                     
31. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
32. See, e.g., Buccafusco & Fagundes, supra note 6 (summarizing empirical literature on economic 
incentives); JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH (2014) (showing the limits of the incentives theory 
to explain the behavior of real-world creators). 
33. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND 
THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004); WILLIAM F. PATRY, MORAL 
PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS (2009). 
34. See generally Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978). 
35. See generally Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997); Rogers v. 
Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981). 
36. See generally New Era Publ’ns. Int’l. v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989); 
Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987). 
37. See infra Part II. 
38. 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015). 
39. Id. 
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and she received multiple death threats after an Egyptian cleric issued a 
fatwa40 against all those who participated in the movie.41 Although the 
Ninth Circuit was “sympathetic to her plight,”42 the court nonetheless 
rejected her arguments that she owned the copyright in her five-second 
performance and—more relevant for purposes of this Article—that she 
had been irreparably harmed “in the copyright sense” by the dissemination 
of copyrighted content on YouTube and the emotional and reputational 
harm that followed.43 “The difficulty with Garcia’s claim,” according to 
the majority, “is that there is a mismatch between her substantive 
copyright claim and the dangers she hopes to remedy through an 
injunction.”44 The court contrasted “copyright’s function,” “the protection 
of the commercial interest of the author,” with the concerns motivating 
Garcia’s suit, namely, “the vicious frenzy against Ms. Garcia that the Film 
caused,” and the resulting “severe emotional distress, the destruction of 
her career and reputation[] and credible death threats.”45 According to the 
Ninth Circuit, Cindy Garcia’s “harms are untethered from—and 
incompatible with—copyright and copyright’s function as the engine of 
expression.”46 
 In the wake of Garcia,47 most commentators48 have embraced the 
                                                     
40. A fatwa is “[a] legal ruling or opinion given by a recognized authority on Islamic law.” Fatwa, 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). While many in the U.S. may be most familiar with fatwas 
in the context of death threats, the limited use of this term in the media may result in a limited 
understanding of its meaning. See Muhammad Hisham Kabbani, What Is a Fatwa?, THE ISLAMIC 
SUPREME COUNCIL OF AMERICA, https://www.islamicsupremecouncil.org/understanding-
islam/legal-rulings/44-what-is-a-fatwa.html [https://perma.cc/W72Z-CK6A]. It is worth noting that 
because there is no central Islamic governing authority, Islamic clerics frequently issue divergent or 
contradictory fatwas. Id. 
41. Id. at 736. 
42. Id. at 737. 
43. Id. at 745 (quoting Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1327 (M. D. Fla. 
2012)). 
44. Id. at 744. 
45. Id. at 786 F.3d 733, 744–45. 
46. Id. 
47. The debate about whether copyright law should protect privacy, however, is not new. See, e.g., 
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1130 (1990) (“Privacy and 
concealment are antithetical to the utilitarian goals of copyright.”); see also Michael Cohn, Rights in 
Private Letters, 8 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 291 (1961); Jane T. Dana, Copyright and Privacy 
Protection of Unpublished Works—The Author’s Dilemma, 13 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 351 
(1977); John M. Kernochan, Protection of Unpublished Works in the United States Before and After 
the Nation Case, 33 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 322 (1986); Jon O. Newman, Copyright Law and the 
Protection of Privacy, 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 459 (1987). 
48. But see Margaret Chon, Copyright’s Other Functions, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 364 
(2016). Professor Edward Lee agrees that there are certain assertions of copyright that are 
“impermissible or suspect,” but he believes copyright may legitimately protect reputation and privacy 
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court’s analysis of the “mismatch” between copyright law’s economic 
rights and the emotional and psychological interests pursued by Cindy 
Garcia. Judge McKeown, the author of Garcia, has vigorously defended 
the opinion, emphasizing that “copyright cannot be everything to 
everybody . . . . No matter how noble and important the values of privacy 
and protection of reputation, copyright is not the direct vehicle for their 
vindication.”49 Professor Alfred Yen is similarly skeptical of copyright 
plaintiffs who “sue to protect personal interests that bear little relation to 
income streams associated with the exploitation of copyright rights.”50 
Professors Eric Goldman and Jessica Silbey have critiqued the 
“weaponization” of copyright law for privacy-related purposes, 
suggesting that such uses threaten the creation of “memory holes”—
dangerous gaps in public knowledge and depletion of the historical 
record.51 Professor Jeannie Fromer has also critiqued lawsuits such as 
Cindy Garcia’s, which reveal “mismatched motivations” compared to the 
“particular scenarios” lawmakers had in mind when enacting the 
Copyright Act.52 Cindy Garcia and other plaintiffs canvassed by Professor 
Fromer stand in contrast with the “archetypical” copyright plaintiff: “one 
who practices in the marketplace, having made a valuable contribution to 
society with the creation and dissemination of a protected work, and 
would like to prevent copying of that work by asserting rights in it.”53 
Garcia provides the clearest and most prominent articulation of 
the market-based limit of copyright law, and it already has been cited 
                                                     
in some cases, but only when “the author of the work is asserting copyright.” Edward Lee, Suspect 
Assertions of Copyright, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 379, 379–82 (2016); accord Rebecca 
Tushnet, Fair Use’s Unfinished Business, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP 399, 405 (2016) (“[A]ny 
interests of the subject of the work as the person about whom the work communicates are not 
copyright interests, though they may well be important personhood interests. Their protection must 
lie in the law of defamation and privacy, rather than in copyright.”).  
49. Hon. M. Margaret McKeown, Censorship in the Guise Of Authorship: Harmonizing Copyright 
and the First Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP 1, 16 (2016); see also Deirdre Keller, 
Copyright to the Rescue: Should Copyright Protect Privacy?, 20 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 36–37  
(2016)(“[E]ven if copyright can be contorted to cover a case like the Ashley Madison case, perhaps 
it should not.”); Pamela Samuleson, Protecting Privacy Through Copyright Law?, in PRIVACY IN THE 
MODERN AGE : THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 191, 198 (Marc Rotenberg et al., eds. 2015) (“[P]rivacy 
harms were quite different in nature from the market harms with which copyright is mainly 
concerned.”). 
50. Alfred Yen, The Challenge of Following Good Advice About Copyright and the First 
Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 412, 413 (2016). 
51. Eric Goldman & Jessica Silbey, Copyright’s Memory Hole, 2019 BYU L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019). 
52. Jeanne C. Fromer, Should the Law Care Why Intellectual Property Rights Have Been Asserted?, 
53 HOUS. L. REV. 549, 587 (2015). 
53. Id. at 588–89. 
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repeatedly in briefs and case law for its limiting principle.54 The Ninth 
Circuit pulled this principle from three different doctrinal contexts. First, 
the court relied on fair use cases in which plaintiffs were motivated by a 
desire for privacy,55 in particular under the critically important fourth fair 
use factor,56 “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value 
of the copyrighted work.”57 Second, the court relied on cases rejecting 
emotional distress damages under the Copyright Act.58 Finally, the court 
looked to other cases finding no irreparable harm where plaintiffs sought 
to use copyright to protect themselves against embarrassment or invasion 
of privacy.59 The court correctly observes that cases in each of these areas 
state quite explicitly that copyright law solely is meant to protect the 
economic interests of the rightsholder and not their emotional, 
psychological, or privacy interests.60 Additionally, there are no reported 
                                                     
54. See, e.g., City of Inglewood v. Teixeira, No. CV-15-01815-MWF(MRWx), 2015 WL 6146269, 
at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2015) (“As Defendant rightly notes, the main justification of the Copyright 
Act is ‘the protection of the commercial interest of the author.’”); Feldhacker v. Homes, 173 F. Supp. 
3d 828, 836 (S.D. Iowa 2016) (“[C]ourts having addressed the issue have found emotional distress 
damages are not available under the Copyright Act.”); Cohen v. G&M Realty, 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 
442 n.18 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to damages for emotional distress. 
Under traditional copyright law, plaintiffs cannot recover such damages.”); Kelley v. Universal Music 
Grp., No. 14 CIV. 2968 (PAE), 2016 WL 5720766, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2016) (“Because 
emotional distress damages are not compensable under the Copyright Act, this claim must also be 
dismissed.”); Defendant Scholastic Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion 
for Temporary Restraining Order, James Castle Collection and Archive, LP v. Scholastic, Inc, No. 
1:17-cv-437-BLW, 2017 WL 9534149 (D. Idaho Oct. 27, 2017) (“Thus, the Castle Collection must 
show that, in the absence of preliminary relief, there will be irreparable harm to the Castle Collection’s 
copyright interests in Castle’s works.”). 
55. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 
395 (4th Cir. 2003)). For a detailed discussion of the Bond v. Blum case, see infra Part II(B). 
56. Lemley, supra note 19, at 187–88 (“Of the four factors—the purpose of the defendant’s use, 
the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount taken, and the market effect on the copyright owner—
the market-effect factor has generally been considered the most important. This likely reflects a 
logical connection between copyright law and market injury.”). 
57. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). Fair use, codified in section 107 of the Copyright Act, instructed courts 
to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a particular use should be deemed noninfringing, in 
light of four factors: (1) the purpose and character of defendant’s use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted 
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion of the copyrighted work used; and (4) the effect 
of the use on the market or value of the copyrighted work. Id. 
58. Garcia, 786 F.3d at 745 (citing Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F.3d 909, 917 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
59. Id. (citing Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F.Supp.2d 1325, 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2012)). 
60. See, e.g., Dawson v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 390 F.3d 1139, 1146 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that 
“‘actual damages’ in the context of the Copyright Act . . . cover only economic damages”) (internal 
citation omitted); Bond, 317 F.3d at 395 (“[T]he protection of privacy is not a function of the copyright 
law.”); Bollea, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 1327 (“The only evidence in the record reflecting harm to [Hogan] 
relates to harm suffered by him personally and harm to his professional image due to the ‘private’ 
nature of the Video’s content. This evidence does not constitute irreparable harm in the context of 
copyright infringement.”). 
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decisions that flatly say the opposite, namely that emotional, 
psychological or privacy interests are valid aims of the copyright 
system.61 
What courts say they are doing, however, is very different from 
what they actually are doing. Courts may insist that copyright law only 
protects an author’s interest in selling their works in reasonably available 
markets, and that only economic harms are redressable through the 
copyright system,62 but a closer look at copyright’s cognizable market 
interests reveals a much more complex picture.63 In all of the contexts 
addressed by the Ninth Circuit—and in several others—courts often 
vindicate interests in copyrighted works that have almost nothing to do 
with access to markets and revenue. They just say they are doing 
something else. 
The following sections reveal a copyright system with a much 
more questionable allegiance to market interests. Across a variety of 
different factual contexts—such as sexual imagery, private documents, 
religious disputes, and political advocacy—courts at times will deny 
liability or a requested remedy when the copyright owner lacks a 
sufficient market interest. Yet at other times, when presented with nearly 
identical noneconomic interests, courts will conjure up a market interest 
in highly questionable ways. Rather than acknowledge the noneconomic 
                                                     
61. At least one court has suggested that emotional distress damages might be available in some 
cases, but it nonetheless denied such damages in the case before it. See Smith v. NBC Universal, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13280 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2008). Additionally, some cases addressing unpublished 
works have noted that an author’s’common law right to first publication reflected both the economic 
value of being first to market as well as the desire of authors to keep certain writings out of public 
view. See also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554 (1985). Post 1978, 
common law copyright has been largely abolished in the United States, see 17 U.S.C. § 301, and, as 
shown infra, courts now often resist expressly embracing privacy interests, even when dealing with 
unpublished works. 
62. See Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474, 480 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(“[C]opyright laws are not ‘matters of strong moral principle’ but rather represent ‘economic 
legislation based on policy decisions that assign rights based on assessments of what legal rules will 
produce the greatest economic good for society as a whole.’”); Buccafusco & Fagundes, supra note 
6, at 2451 (“Copyright law assumes that authors will only object to uses of their works that threaten 
these sorts of market substitution harms.”). 
63. See Chon, supra note 48, at 366 (“If we limit our understanding of legitimate goals of copyright 
protection to market actors or commercial ends, we are missing a lot of the copyright story, past and 
especially present.”). Professor Balganesh demonstrates that copyright assertions in service of 
noneconomic interests have a long historical tradition, notwithstanding more recent efforts to 
circumscribe legitimate copyright motivations. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Censorial Copyright, 
73 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 2) (“Ever since its origins, copyright law has 
seen a robust set of infringement claims being brought that have no connection whatsoever to the 
market. These are not just infringement claims that lack a market basis owing to the creator’s unique 
circumstances; they are instead claims that are motivated by decidedly non-market considerations.”). 
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stakes at issue in the case—and expressly weigh the policy interests 
actually at stake in the dispute—courts find a way to pigeonhole only 
some sympathetic claims into traditional economic justifications. The 
result is market gibberish—opaque reasoning that further entrenches the 
perception of copyright as a property right designed for the powerful.64 
Each of the following sections reveals a different factual setting in which 
market gibberish draws inconsistent and often deeply troubling lines 
between legitimate and illegitimate copyright interests. 
A. Sex Tapes 
The Garcia Court’s primary authority for the notion that a disputed use 
must cause an economic injury in “the copyright sense” is Hulk Hogan’s 
copyright lawsuit against Gawker Media.65 In Bollea v. Gawker,66 Hulk 
Hogan was denied a preliminary injunction against the distribution of 
secretly recorded, sexually explicit video clips of him and a woman.67 As 
introduced by the court, “[a]ccording to Plaintiff’s submissions, 
approximately six years ago, he engaged in consensual sexual relations 
with a woman that was not his wife. Allegedly unbeknownst to Plaintiff, 
the encounter was videotaped.”68 After Gawker posted excerpts of the 
video on its website, the court denied Hogan’s request for an injunction 
on the basis that the use was likely fair and that Hogan was not sufficiently 
irreparably harmed.69 On the issue of fair use, the court explained: 
Plaintiff in this case cannot legitimately claim that he seeks to 
enforce the copyright because he intends to publish the 
Video . . . [I]t cannot reasonably be argued that Gawker Media is 
usurping Plaintiff’s potential market for the Video (which 
Plaintiff himself characterizes as a ‘sex tape’) by publishing 
excerpts of the video.70 
The excerpted video was likely legitimate news-reporting “on the public’s 
                                                     
64. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 48, at 409 (“Another lesson that might be taken away from 
Garcia, however, is that American copyright law hesitates to threaten large corporations.”). 
65. Garcia, 786 F.3d at 745. This case is now best known for Hogan’s subsequent, successful state 
law privacy claim against Gawker, which ultimately bankrupted the company through a $140 million 
jury verdict. See Sydney Ember, Gawker and Hulk Hogan Reach $31 Million Settlement, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/business/media/gawker-hulk-hogan-
settlement.html [https://perma.cc/HUE5-KL8Q]. 
66. 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (M.D. Fla. 2012). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 1327. 
69. Id. at 1329. 
70. Id. 
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fascination with celebrity sex in general, and more specifically Plaintiff’s 
status as a ‘Real Life American Hero to many.’”71 
Similarly, addressing irreparable harm, the court emphasized, “[t]he 
justification of the copyright law is the protection of the commercial 
interest of the artist/author.”72 Hogan’s lawsuit, by contrast, sought to 
protect other interests: 
After attempting to quell any distribution or publication of 
excerpts of the Video in an effort to protect his mental well-being, 
personal relationships, and professional image, Plaintiff cannot 
legitimately claim that he is concerned with protecting the 
financial worth of the Video. This is not a case in which the 
posting of copyrighted materials implicates the ownership value 
of the copyright because it impacts the commercial advantage of 
controlling the release of those materials.73 
Because there was “no evidence that Plaintiff ever intends to release 
the Video,” and because Gawker’s posting of blurry excerpts “may 
actually increase” demand for the film, the court denied relief.74 
The court in Bollea repeatedly drew its reasoning from Michaels 
v. Internet Entertainment Group (“Michaels II”),75 an earlier case against 
Paramount Pictures and its tabloid news program, Hard Copy.76 In 
Michaels II, Hard Copy had aired excerpts of a sexually explicit video that 
Poison-lead singer Bret Michaels and actress Pamela Lee (née Anderson) 
had made while dating and that had leaked online.77 Michaels and Lee had 
both sued an Internet-based pornography company, IEG, for copyright 
infringement, and Lee individually sued Paramount. In September 1998, 
the district court granted summary judgment to Paramount on Lee’s 
copyright claims, finding fair use.78 Lee and Michaels “made the Tape for 
their personal use with no intent of publishing it at any time,” while 
“Paramount used the brief excerpts described above to illustrate its news 
story about the Tape’s imminent release, and to arouse viewer interest in 
the Hard Copy broadcast.”79 Although the “unpublished” nature of the 
                                                     
71. Id.  
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 1330. 
74. Id. at 1330–31. 
75. No. CV 98-0583 DDP (CWx) (Michaels II), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20786 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 
1998). 
76. Bollea v. Gawker, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2012). 
77. Michaels II, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20786, at *2.  
78. Id. at *2. 
79. Id. at *33. 
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work often militates against fair use, the court emphasized that Lee 
planned to “destroy” the tape, not to reap the benefits of first publication.80 
Moreover, under the “market effects” fair use factor, the court reasoned, 
“Lee is not in direct competition with Paramount in the production of 
television entertainment news programs such as Hard Copy. Paramount’s 
transformative use of the Tape excerpts to produce an entertainment news 
story does not affect Lee’s market for the same service, because Lee is not 
in such a market.”81 
 Bollea and the September 1998 Michaels II opinion might appear to 
establish a clear rule for celebrity sex tapes—if you want to keep them 
private, copyright is not for you. Except five months earlier, the Michaels 
I82 Court sent a very different message. In April 1998, the same judge 
granted Michaels and Lee a preliminary injunction against the Internet 
pornography website, IEG, forbidding it from releasing even short 
excerpts of their sex tape.83 The April/September contrast in Michaels I/II 
is stark. The court in Michaels I expressly acknowledged that “plaintiffs 
have declared that they made this Tape for their personal use only with no 
intent of publishing it at any time,” and there was testimony that Bret 
Michaels had even turned down a $1 million offer to license the video.84 
Unlike in Michaels II, however, the court emphasized without 
qualification, “[t]he fact that a work is unpublished is a critical element of 
its ‘nature.’”85 Moreover, Michael’s rejection of licensing opportunities 
did not doom—and instead may have helped—his claim:  
“IEG has presented evidence of extensive interest among Internet 
users in text and images regarding Lee . . . [W]ere IEG to 
disseminate short segments of the Tape under the guise of fair 
use, these segments would propagate quickly through the Internet, 
saturating the potential market for the plaintiffs’ copyrighted 
work.”86 
Bret Michaels and Pamela Lee had expressly disclaimed any actual 
interest in profiting from their sex tape, yet the court in April 1998 granted 
                                                     
80. Id. at *34 (distinguishing Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985)) (“It 
cannot be said therefore that Paramount ‘scooped’ Lee’s intended first publication in the way that the 
Nation scooped Harper & Row’s intended first publication of President Ford’s memoir.”).  
81. Id. at *38. 
82. Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp. (Michaels I), 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998).  
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 832, 835. 
85. Id. at 835. 
86. Id. at 836. 
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them—or whichever of them was ultimately deemed the author87—
exclusive control over a marketplace that had “extensive interest” in 
naked imagery of Pamela Lee.88 Because the court could point to a market 
that had an interest in Lee, copyright law gave Lee and Michaels the right 
to effectively destroy that market.89 Five months later, however, Lee’s 
disclaimer of any actual market interest doomed her claim against 
Paramount. 
What explains the difference? Why does a desire to protect privacy and 
emotional well-being deny Hogan and Lee relief in Bollea and Michaels 
II, while Michaels can pursue those interests in Michaels I when he 
disclaimed the profit motives that copyright is designed to protect? None 
of these cases have anything to do with the rightsholder’s economic 
incentives, so why does Bret Michaels have a right to control the potential 
market for his sex tape? There are two possible explanations. 
The first possibility is that the different reasoning in the cases reflects 
the very different defendants in Bollea/Michaels II compared with 
Michaels I. The former cases involved defendants who were at least 
arguably engaged in celebrity news reporting, while the defendant in 
Michaels I was unquestionably a commercial pornography company.90 
News reporting and journalism are core activities protected by the fair use 
doctrine, while commercial exploitations of copyrighted works are much 
more likely to be deemed unfair.91 Bollea and Michaels II defer charitably 
                                                     
87. Michaels apparently recorded the video—i.e. pressed “record”—but there was a dispute as to 
whether Lee could be deemed a coauthor and thus joint owner over the work. Id. at 830. 
88. Id. at 836. See Fromer, supra note 52, at 577 (“In the course of finding a likelihood of success 
on copyright infringement and no fair use, the court treated the sex tape as if Michaels and Anderson 
were market participants who would be harmed by the tape’s release.”); Stephen McIntyre, Private 
Rights and Public Wrongs: Fair Use as a Remedy for Private Censorship, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 61, 81 
(2012) (“The court’s emphasis on market harm is difficult to square with the plaintiffs’ obvious lack 
of concern for the sex tape’s marketability.”). 
89. See also Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 761 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting fair use of news 
anchor in a wet t-shirt contest even though plaintiffs had “no present intention of exploiting the 
market” because they showed “ample evidence of the vast market for the Bosley photograph, and they 
persuasively argued that Defendant’s publication and sale of the picture ‘directly competed for a share 
of the market for’ the Bosley photograph” (quoting Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
568 (1985))). 
90. See also Balsley, 691 F.3d at 754 (rejecting Hustler Magazine’s fair use defense and describing 
it as “a monthly magazine that ‘contains graphic images and stories about sex’” and that “publishes 
extremely illicit photographs, both real and fabricated”). 
91. See Michaels I, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 834 (“IEG’s president has declared that IEG builds its 
subscriber base by promising and delivering digital images from ‘celebrity video tapes.’ The 
commercial nature of IEG’s proposed display of short segments of the Tape weighs against a finding 
of fair use.” (internal citation omitted)). 
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to the transformative, journalistic purposes of Gawker and Hard Copy,92 
whereas the Michaels I court is demonstrably skeptical of any comparably 
transformative value of IEG’s offerings.93 To be clear, the distinction 
between news reporting and commercial exploitation may sufficiently 
justify the divergent outcomes in these cases,94 and the court in Michaels I 
legitimately may have been more protective of privacy when dealing with 
a purely commercial endeavor. 
The problem, however, is that the courts never say that they are 
balancing privacy vs. journalism or privacy vs. pornography. They instead 
manipulate the plaintiffs’ market interests to variably include or exclude 
defendants’ use, when there is no indication that their desire for sexual 
privacy at all hinges on the identity of the defendant. In all three cases, the 
plaintiffs’ goal is to claw back and eliminate the sexually explicit videos 
from the public sphere; what changes between the three cases is the 
interests of the defendants in publishing those videos.95 But rather than 
acknowledging that the plaintiffs’ interests remain constant, the courts 
reframe the plaintiffs’ supposed market interests to bolster the courts’ 
assessment of the defendants’ respective endeavors. There is no evidence 
that the plaintiffs had any actual economic interest in their sexual imagery 
in any of the three cases, yet the courts conjure one up when confronted 
with a highly unsympathetic defendant. The unchanging underlying 
interests in sexual autonomy and privacy are buried under the market 
gibberish. 
The second, and more troubling, explanation is that the different 
reasoning between the cases reflects the different plaintiffs. There is some 
reason to be concerned that courts are manipulating market interests based 
less on the relative merits of the plaintiffs’ claims and more on their 
relative character. In Bollea, the court repeatedly mentions that the 
secretly-recorded video was of the plaintiff having “sexual relations with 
                                                     
92. Bollea v. Gawker, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (“Defendants[] published the 
video excerpts ‘in conjunction with the news reporting function.’ That factual finding supports a 
colorable fair use defense.”); Michaels II, No. CV 98-0583 DDP (CWx), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20786, at *31 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 10, 1998) (“Paramount’s use of the excerpts on Hard Copy clearly has 
the character of ‘news reporting.’”). 
93. Michaels I, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 835 (“From the descriptions of the Tape presented to the Court, it 
does not seem likely that the portrayal of two people engaged in sexual relations on the Tape 
constitutes a set of facts or ideas whose discussion requires seeing the Tape.”). 
94. But see Jennifer Rothman, Commercial Speech, Commercial Use, and the Intellectual Property 
Quagmire, 101 VA. L. REV. 1929, 1933 (2015) (“To date, no convincing basis has been articulated 
for distinguishing commercial and noncommercial speech and uses in IP laws.”).  
95. See id. (“Even though the use of a copyrighted work in commercial advertising and other 
commercial settings might raise dignitary concerns, it does not necessarily raise more concerns than 
in a noncommercial context.”). 
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a woman that was not his wife”96—a detail that might add to the salacious 
appeal of the Gawker post, but that should have little bearing upon the 
public’s right to watch Hulk Hogan having oral sex and intercourse. 
Similarly in the Michaels cases, the court repeatedly emphasized that 
Pamela Lee had become famous in large part based on “sex and sexual 
appeal”—a characterization it expressly (and arguably incorrectly97) did 
not apply to Michaels.98 The implication might therefore be that Lee’s and 
Hogan’s past sexual exploits implicitly give them a weaker stake in 
controlling the public dissemination of their recorded sexual relationships. 
The only person, by contrast, who undeniably deserved to control 
downstream spread of their sexual imagery was the upstanding musician 
(Michaels) who had been offered $1 million to decide whether he and his 
ex-girlfriend’s sexual relationship would be widely seen.99 The two of 
them together had a cognizable market interest; she alone did not. Again, 
the difference in outcome between the cases may very well be due to the 
courts’ desire to protect free press interests, but the opacity of the courts’ 
market gibberish makes it impossible to know. 
The division in reasoning between Michaels I and Bollea/Michaels II 
might seem like an overly academic concern or merely a problem for 
wealthy celebrities thrust further into the spotlight than they might 
otherwise wish. This, unfortunately, is not so. Copyright law has become 
an increasingly valuable tool for everyday people to combat the 
unauthorized disclosure of sexual images via the Internet—i.e. revenge 
porn100—and the takeaway from these cases is quite grim for non-celebrity 
victims of revenge porn similarly seeking to protect their sexual autonomy 
                                                     
96. 913 F. Supp. 2d at 1327. 
97. See, e.g., Poison, Unskinny Bop, GENIUS, https://genius.com/Poison-unskinny-bop-lyrics 
[https://perma.cc/X84W-TJ4P] (“What’s got you so jumpy?/ Why can’t you sit still, yeah?/ Like 
gasoline, you wanna pump me/ And leave me when you get your fill, yeah.”); Poison, Talk Dirty to 
Me, GENIUS, https://genius.com/Poison-talk-dirty-to-me-lyrics [https://perma.cc/WN6M-KRFH] 
(“Cause baby we’ll be/ At the drive-in/ In the old man’s Ford/ Behind the bushes/ Till I’m screaming 
for more/ Down the basement/ Lock the cellar door/ And baby/ Talk dirty to me.”). 
98. See Michaels I, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 842 (“Michaels and Lee declare that they have cultivated fame 
throughout their careers . . . . In Lee’s case, her fame arises in part from television and movie roles 
based on sex and sexual appeal.”); Michaels II, No. CV 98-0583 DDP(CWx), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20786, at *26 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 10, 1998) (“There is no genuine issue of fact as to the reason for Lee’s 
fame. She is famous as a sex symbol.”); id. at *28–29 (“Given the uncontroverted fact that images of 
Lee engaged in sex are already widely available, the intrusiveness of these images is slight when 
balanced against Paramount’s First Amendment interest in conveying information about the imminent 
release of the Tape, and the effect of such imminent release on Lee’s entertainment career.”) 
99. See also Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 766 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Looking to the totality of the 
circumstances, counsel’s comment that Bosley is a role model for his daughter was brief and did not 
impermissibly characterize any of the relevant facts or legal theories.”). 
100. Gilden, supra note 11. 
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and privacy. For example, if a woman’s ex-boyfriend posts sexually 
explicit photos of her online and she (assuming she was the author of the 
photos) sues her ex or the hosting website to take the copyrighted photos 
down, Bollea and Michaels II map onto her case quite directly and 
negatively.101 She similarly “cannot legitimately claim that [s]he seeks to 
enforce the copyright because [s]he intends to publish the Video” and 
similarly is not concerned with “commercial advantage of controlling the 
release of those materials”; instead, she is seeking to protect her “mental 
well-being, personal relationships, and professional image.”102 Copyright 
assertions have been very useful in getting websites to voluntarily take 
down revenge porn imagery, and have resulted in some default judgments 
in victims’ favor, but no copyright revenge porn case has resulted yet in a 
published judicial decision.103 The sex tape precedents signal that unless 
the plaintiff can point to some preexisting market interest in her sexual 
relationships,104 she will not have suffered harm in the copyright sense 
sufficient to obtain the necessary injunctive relief. Bret Michaels could 
point to one million dollars in market demand for his sex tape; the vast 
majority of other individuals similarly seeking to protect their sexual 
privacy cannot. 
B. Privacy 
The sex tape cases are merely the tip of the iceberg of copyright’s 
market gibberish. Although these sexually explicit works present 
copyright law with a uniquely intimate set of interests in privacy and 
autonomy, numerous other copyright disputes involve documents that 
plaintiffs wish to keep out of the public eye.105 And again, rather than 
explain how they are balancing plaintiffs’ privacy interests against 
defendants’ expressive, commercial, journalistic, or scholarly interests, 
                                                     
101. See Peter W. Cooper, The Right to Be Virtually Clothed, 91 WASH. L. REV. 817, 829–30 
(2016) (citing Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015)) (“Ultimately, while copyright 
law has been useful for survivors that took the pictures or videos themselves, it was not designed to 
protect privacy, and survivors are out of luck if someone else took their nude photo.”). 
102. Bollea, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 1329–30; accord Balganesh, supra note 63, at 3 (“As should be 
obvious, copyright’s market rationale played no role in the plaintiff’s creation of the work and in her 
infringement claim. Instead, the claim was driven by distinctively non-economic considerations.”). 
103. See Gilden, supra note 11, at 82–87. 
104. See Balsley, 691 F.3d at 761 (pointing to “ample evidence of the vast market for the Bosley 
photograph”). 
105. See Fromer, supra note 52, at 560–61 (surveying cases where the plaintiff “appears to be 
interested in preventing the defendant from revealing, or at least further proliferating, information 
about him or her” and “does not seem to worry about being harmed in the marketplace for his or her 
copyrighted work, which is the utilitarian motivator for the copyright incentive.”). 
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courts instead regularly engage in inconsistent and tortured market 
rhetoric. As much as contemporary courts106 insist that “the protection of 
privacy is not a function of the copyright law,”107 the cases below show 
that copyright indeed protects privacy under the guise of market interests. 
Outside the sex tape context, courts have inconsistently permitted 
copyright holders to stop the spread of intimate or embarrassing 
documents. The most notable example of this tension is the divergent 
analyses of similar privacy interests in Núñez v. Caribbean International 
News Corp.108 and Monge v. Maya Magazines.109 In Núñez, the plaintiff 
had taken nude modeling photos for Joyce Giraud, who later won the Miss 
Puerto Rico Universe pageant.110 A local news station and newspaper 
obtained and published these photos to discuss whether they were 
“pornographic” and whether Giraud was, accordingly, morally fit to serve 
as Miss Puerto Rico Universe.111 The First Circuit held that the newspaper 
had made fair use of the photos.112 The court emphasized that the 
defendant sought “merely to provide news reporting to a hungry public. 
And the fact that the story is admittedly on the tawdry side of the news 
ledger does not make it any less of a fair use.”113 Moreover, it rejected any 
cognizable market harm: 
[T]he purpose of dissemination of the [modeling portfolio] 
pictures in question is not to make money, but to publicize; they 
are distributed for free to the professional modeling community 
rather than sold for a profit. The fact that a relatively poor 
reproduction was displayed on the cover of a newspaper should 
not change the demand for the portfolio. If anything, it might 
increase it . . . Núñez does not suggest that he ever tried to sell 
portfolio photographs to newspapers, or even that he had the right 
to do so under the contract with Giraud.114 
Because Núñez never tried to make money off the sale of the 
                                                     
106. In old common law copyright cases, now expressly preempted by the federal Copyright Act, 
courts would sometimes recognize authors’ privacy interests in their unpublished works. See 
Newman, supra note 47, at 463–66; Jake Linford, A Second Look at the Right of First Publication, 
58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y OF U.S.A. 585, 618–20 (2011). 
107. Garcia v. Google, 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 
395 (4th Cir. 2003)). 
108. 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000). 
109. 688 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012). 
110. See Núñez, 235 F.3d at 21. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 25. 
113. Id. at 22–23. 
114. Id. at 25. 
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photographs, he had no cognizable market interest in the photos. 
Moreover, to the extent that what was really motivating the lawsuit was 
his ability to protect his professional reputation—in part by protecting the 
reputation, privacy, and dignity of clients like Giraud—the court 
concluded, “[t]he overall impact to Núñez’s business is irrelevant to a 
finding of fair use.”115 Because no one had tried to make money off the 
nude photos in question, and because reputational interests were off the 
table, the use here did not implicate a legitimate copyright interest. 
When the context shifts from private nude photos to private wedding 
photos, however, the market analysis changes dramatically. In Monge, 
plaintiffs Noela Lorelia Monge and Jorge Reynoso were a pop 
singer/model and manager/producer who had secretly married.116 After 
the couple’s driver obtained secret photos of the wedding celebrations—
including a photo of Monge revealing her underwear—and sold them to a 
celebrity gossip magazine, the couple successfully sued the magazine, 
defeating a fair use defense.117 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
publication harmed the potential market for their copyrighted works, even 
though “the couple did not intend to sell publication rights to the 
photos.”118 If they didn’t intend to sell these photos, why then did they 
have a sufficient market interest? Because in the past these celebrities had 
sold other photos to celebrity gossip magazines:119 “The couple is 
undisputedly in the business of selling images of themselves and they 
have done so in the past.”120 Even though the couple had actively hidden 
their wedding from the public, they “have ‘the right to change [their] 
mind.’ They reasonably could decide to sell the images for profit in the 
future . . . .”121 Because there was a market ready to pay for their photos, 
the couple had the right to keep their private lives out of the hands of that 
market. Only because the couple had been willing and able to sell their 
privacy in the past were they allowed to use copyright law to protect their 
privacy interests in the future. Although the court “pointedly note[d]” that 
                                                     
115. Id. at 24. 
116. Monge v. Maya Magazines, 688 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 2012). 
117. Id. at 1175. Distinguishing Núñez, the Ninth Circuit observed, “[t]he photos were not even 
necessary to prove that controverted fact—the marriage certificate . . . may have sufficed to inform 
the public.” Id. 
118. Id. at 1180. 
119. Id. at 1168 (“In the past, Maya has paid Monge to pose for pictures published in its magazine, 
‘H Para Hombres.’ Reynoso was paid $25,000 for photos of his wedding to his former wife Pilar 
Montenegro, as well as $40,000 for photos of his vacation in Paris with Montenegro.”). 
120. Id. at 1181. 
121. Id. at 1182 (quoting Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 
1119 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
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it was proceeding “only under copyright principles, not privacy law,” the 
couple was able to leverage potential market demand into heightened 
privacy control.122 
In Núñez, Miss Puerto Rico Universe was merely trying to break into a 
modeling career, so her photos were up for grabs by media outlets 
interested in discussing her naked body and moral fitness.123 In Monge, 
Monge and Reynoso had been able to cash in on their celebrity, so they 
had the right to choose if and when their private moments became public 
in the future.124 The cases purport to be focused on reasonable market 
effects, when they are really about who can use copyright’s economic 
rights to protect their personal needs. As with the sex tape cases, there is 
a lot more going on in these privacy cases that might be swaying the 
ultimate outcome—i.e. theft versus lawful acquisition of the photos; direct 
versus indirect profit—but again the courts reframe privacy interests as 
market interests in order to reach the preferred outcome within copyright’s 
traditional economic framework. 
Numerous other decisions reveal courts manipulating market interests 
in order to variably protect privacy concerns. For example, although the 
Second Circuit in Salinger v. Random House125 gave J.D. Salinger the 
right to use copyright law to stop the quotation of his private letters in an 
unauthorized biography, the heirs of other authors have been denied such 
opportunities.126 Even though Salinger “disavowed any intention to 
publish [his letters] during his lifetime,” his potential market had been 
sufficiently impaired.127 Like the celebrity couple in Monge, “Salinger has 
the right to change his mind. He is entitled to protect his opportunity to 
sell his letters, an opportunity estimated by his literary agent to have a 
current value in excess of $500,000.”128 By contrast, even though Richard 
Wright’s widow had previously entered into an agreement to publish her 
late husband’s personal letters, the court found insufficient harm to her 
potential market interest because “little has been done on the project in 
two decades . . . . Plaintiff has offered no evidence that the project will go 
forward.”129 The court in Shloss v. Sweeney130 went even further, allowing 
                                                     
122. Id. at 1177. 
123. See Núñez, 235 F.3d 18, 22–23 (1st Cir. 2000). 
124. See Monge, 688 F.3d at 1181–82.  
125. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987). 
126. See id. at 99; infra notes 121–125. 
127. Random House, 811 F.2d at 99. 
128. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
129. Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 739 (2d Cir. 1991). 
130. 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
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a Joyce scholar to assert a “copyright misuse” defense against the Joyce 
estate for prohibiting a biographer from publishing letters exchanged 
between Joyce and his daughter, Lucia.131 As alleged by the scholar, 
“Stephen Joyce, as an agent of the Estate, made veiled threats of copyright 
litigation to effect his underlying purpose of protecting the Joyce family’s 
privacy.”132 According to the court, Joyce’s aggressive efforts to protect 
his family’s privacy lacked a sufficient “nexus between the copyright 
holder’s actions and the public policy embedded in the grant of a 
copyright.”133 His effort to maintain family privacy “undermined the 
copyright policy of ‘promoting invention and creative expression.’”134 
Yet in plenty of other cases, courts have been willing to allow authors 
to suppress downstream creative works in the absence of any reasonably 
likely market competition with the rightsholder.135 Take for example, the 
Second Circuit’s other major J.D. Salinger decision, Salinger v. 
Colting,136 where the court held that Salinger’s estate was likely to defeat 
a fair use defense raised by the author of the book 60 Years Later: Coming 
Through the Rye. Even though “Salinger has publicly disclaimed any 
intention of authorizing a sequel” to Catcher in the Rye, “Salinger has the 
right to change his mind and, even if he has no intention of changing his 
mind, there is value in the right not to authorize derivative works.”137 
Similarly in Love v. Kwitny,138 the court rejected a fair use defense where 
the author of a book critical of interventionist U.S. foreign policy quoted 
portions of an unpublished manuscript written in 1960 by the New York 
Times’ Iran correspondent.139 Even though over twenty years had passed 
and the former correspondent had “no more than ‘uncrystallized plans’”140 
to ever publish the manuscript, he nonetheless retained “‘the right to 
change his mind. He is entitled to protect his opportunity to sell’ his 
                                                     
131. Id. at 1080. 
132. Id. 
133. Id.  
134. Id. 
135. See also Morris v. Guetta, No. LA CV12-00684 JAK, 2013 WL 440127, at *13 (C.D. Cal. 
Feb. 4, 2013) (“The record does not clearly show a harm to the market for, or value of, the Photograph, 
and the amount of harm and potential harm based on the nature of the market is disputed. However, 
even assuming there was no harm to the market, this would not excuse an unjustified use . . . .”). 
136. 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010). 
137. Id. at 74 (emphasis omitted).  
138. 706 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
139.  Id. at 1135. 
140. Id. (quoting Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1264 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
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paper.”141 
This “right to change his mind” is framed entirely as an author’s 
economic prerogative to decide whether and when to exploit a market, 
and not as a way to protect the broader range of socioemotional interests 
tied up in creative works.142 Courts in the Second Circuit have maintained, 
for decades, that “the justification of the copyright law is the protection of 
the commercial interest of the artist/author. It is not to coddle artistic 
vanity or to protect secrecy, but to stimulate creation by protecting its 
rewards.”143 Yet the inconsistent availability of this “right to change his 
mind” makes it hard to escape the conclusion that, like in the sex tape 
context, courts are manipulating market interests based on their subjective 
views of the parties.144 Successful plaintiff J.D. Salinger was “a highly 
regarded American novelist and short-story writer,”145 while the losing 
defendant in Love was skeptical of where his “country’s real interests 
lie.”146 The court in Monge pitted “music celebrities” against “a gossip 
magazine” and a “paparazzo.”147 Stephen Joyce was widely known as 
presiding “over one of the most combative and obstructive of all literary 
estates,”148 and “Puerto Ricans were generally concerned about the 
qualifications of Giraud for Miss Puerto Rico Universe.”149 The difference 
                                                     
141. Love v. Kwitny, 706 F. Supp. 1123, 1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting Salinger v. Random 
House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987)) (emphasis omitted); accord New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. 
Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Since the district court accepted New Era’s 
contention that it would commission an authorized biography of Hubbard and that all Hubbard’s 
writings, published and unpublished, would be made available for that purpose, it is difficult to 
conclude, as does the district court, that the book published by Holt would have no effect on the 
market for New Era’s forthcoming book.”). 
142. See Newman, supra note 47, at 469 (“For the most part, however, the degree to which 
American copyright law protects the privacy of writers today appears to depend on whether the 
privacy interest can be advanced almost coincidentally with the advancement of the economic 
interests.”). 
143. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 81 n.9 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. 
Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1526 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)) (emphasis omitted). 
144. See Kate O’Neill, Against Dicta: A Legal Method for Rescuing Fair Use From the Right of 
First Publication, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 369, 374 (2001) (“In a judgment for the copyright holder, the 
judicial rhetoric often includes indignant allusions to the copier’s greed or laziness in attempting to 
capitalize on another’s creativity, while a judgment for the copier piously affirms the defendant’s 
scholarly and selfless contribution to the expansion of knowledge.”). 
145. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1987). 
146. Love v. Kwitny, 706 F. Supp. 1123, 1126 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
147. Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 2012). 
148. Mark O’Connell, Has James Joyce Been Set Free?, NEW YORKER (Jan. 11, 2012), 
https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/has-james-joyce-been-set-free 
[https://perma.cc/7J7V-VZCR]; see also Robert Spoo, Three Myths for Aging Copyrights: Tithonus, 
Dorian Gray, Ulysses, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 77 (2012).  
149. Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l. News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2000). 
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in outcomes cannot be justified in terms of whether the rightsholder in 
each of these cases actually had an economic interest in publishing their 
work—none did;150 the difference instead might be justified based on 
where the perceived equities lie between the parties. 
Courts’ repeated assurances that copyright law does not vindicate 
privacy interests accordingly cannot be taken as a coherent policy limit; it 
must instead be seen as a selective way of screening out unsavory cases. 
The strange case of Bond v. Blum151 is perhaps the best example of this 
screening function. In Bond, the copyright owner “beat his father to death 
with a hammer in his grandparents’ garage” when he was seventeen; after 
a stint in juvenile detention, he changed his name and wrote the 
manuscript for a book titled Self-Portrait of a Patricide: How I Got Away 
with Murder, which “describes in horrific detail how Bond planned and 
committed the murder of his father.”152 In the late 1980s, Bond 
unsuccessfully circulated his manuscript in an attempt to find a 
publisher.153 Several years later he met and married a woman named 
Alyson Slavin.154 In July 2000 Alyson sued her ex-husband for exclusive 
custody of their three children.155 In the state custody hearing that 
followed, her ex-husband attempted to introduce Bond’s unpublished 
manuscript—which he obtained through a private investigator—as 
evidence that the Bond household was not a safe place for children.156 
Bond sued in federal court for copyright infringement to prevent this 
courtroom use of his copyrighted work, and the Fourth Circuit ultimately 
found the proposed use to be fair.157 The court observed, “the narrow 
purpose of defendants’ use of the manuscript is for the evidentiary value 
of its content insofar as it contains admissions that Bond . . . bragged 
about his conduct in murdering his father.”158 Moreover, with respect to 
the potential market harm from the proposed use, the court reasoned as 
follows: 
                                                     
150. See Stephen McIntyre, Private Rights and Public Wrongs: Fair Use as a Remedy for Private 
Censorship, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 61, 80 (2012) (“Courts applying the doctrine in private censorship 
cases often give unnecessary attention to market harm, even though the copyright owner clearly does 
not care about the marketability of his or her work.”). 
151. 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003). 




156. Id. at 391. 
157. Id. at 392, 397. 
158. Id. at 395. 
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The only harm that we can discern from his arguments is a claim 
that he has lost the right to control the release of a “private” or 
“confidential” document . . . . [T]he protection of privacy is not a 
function of the copyright law . . . . If privacy is the essence of 
Bond’s claim, then his action must lie in some common-law right 
to privacy, not in the Copyright Act.159 
Because there was “no evidence that the admission into evidence of 
Bond’s manuscript would adversely affect its marketability”160 and the 
potential privacy interest was categorically beyond the reach of copyright 
law, Bond’s copyright action was dismissed.161 
To be clear, Bond should be an easy case for fair use. It is hard to 
conjure any policy justification that would allow a copyright holder to 
keep relevant162 documentary evidence of past misdeeds out of the view 
of a family court and, accordingly, place the interests of an author in a 
twenty-year-old unpublished manuscript over the best interests of a child. 
To the extent that Bond had actively solicited publishers for his work, this 
suggests that there was not any bona fide privacy interest at all.163 The 
problem in this case is not that Bond was trying to protect his privacy; the 
problem instead is that Bond lacked any interest that would justify 
preventing the very limited use of his old manuscript.164 But instead of 
just saying that, the court flatly declares that copyright is not meant to 
protect privacy. This statement gets picked up by cases like Garcia165 and 
Bollea166 to reject privacy and safety interests that may be far more 
significant. 
The interests at stake in copyright’s diverse set of “privacy” cases vary 
dramatically, and the policy questions they raise differ greatly. For 
example: when does celebrity gossip justify privacy intrusions? Do heirs 
                                                     
159. Id. (emphasis added). 
160. Id. at 396. 
161. Id. at 395–96. 
162. Bond argued that the manuscript was “a highly fictionalized and stylized work,” that might 
potentially raise questions of undue prejudice in the custody hearing, but local rules of evidence would 
seem better suited to this concern than copyright law. Id. at 390. 
163. Id. at 395 (“But at oral argument, he conceded that the document was not confidential.”). 
164. Cf. Newman, supra note 47, at 475 (“Perhaps it is sufficient to recognize that the continuum 
exists and to accord a lesser degree of protection to the privacy interest as the circle of distribution 
becomes broader. There need not be an ‘all or nothing’ test.”). 
165. Garcia v. Google, 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015). 
166. Bollea v. Gawke Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1330 (M.D. Fla. 2012). 
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have privacy interests in works they inherit from a family member?167 
Does copyright ever limit a court’s evidentiary needs? Copyright courts 
are actively confronting and resolving these difficult policy questions that 
have little to do with an author’s economic incentives,168 but they shy 
away from answering them directly.169 Rather than confront the privacy 
interests before them, they muddle market interests in order to facially 
adhere to the traditional economic rationales for copyright while 
nonetheless reaching their desired results. The results in these cases are 
not necessarily wrong, but their opaque reasoning draws boundaries 
around the copyright system based on wealth, celebrity, and perceived 
moral worth, and not based on a principled allegiance to economic 
interests. 
C. Religious Disputes 
The third area in which market gibberish repeatedly emerges is in the 
perhaps surprisingly large body of copyright cases involving disputes over 
religious practices and related texts. To the extent that religious beliefs, 
rituals, and evangelism are rooted in the dissemination of authored texts, 
copyright law has proven to be an appealing vehicle for religious entities 
to protect themselves from critique, for rival sects to gain an upper hand, 
or for shutting down certain religious practices altogether. Although 
money does, of course, often mix with religion,170 it is difficult to 
ultimately reduce any of the following disputes to a genuine economic 
interest in a copyrighted text. Yet success in these cases typically hinges 
precisely on reframing religious interests as economic ones. 
The Church of Scientology and its affiliated organizations have 
repeatedly tried to use copyright law to maintain the secrecy of its core 
texts, as well as related writings of Scientology founder L. Ron 
                                                     
167. See, e.g., New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 585 (2d Cir. 1989) (Oakes, 
J., concurring) (“Salinger is a decision which, even if rightly decided on its facts, involved underlying, 
if latent, privacy implications not present here by virtue of Hubbard’s death.”). 
168. See Newman, supra note 47, at 460 (“[C]opyright law often raises issues that require hard 
thinking about the essential nature of the right to be protected and especially about the relationship of 
that right to other rights protected by neighboring fields of law.”). 
169. See McIntyre, supra note 150, at 80 (“By treating private censorship cases in the same manner 
as traditional copyright disputes, courts engage in awkward analyses that fail to properly balance 
public and private interests.”). 
170. See OUR LADY OF PERPETUAL EXEMPTION CHURCH, http://www.ourladyofperpetualexemption.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/LWS4-YBHP]; Melissa Locker, John Oliver Becomes a Televangelist and Finally Starts His 
Own Church, TIME (Aug. 17, 2015) http://time.com/3999933/john-oliver-televangelist-church-alst-week-
tonight/ [https://perma.cc/75TG-QLXY].  
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Hubbard.171 Their track record shows how religious interests have been 
variably rejected and vindicated through copyright’s traditional market 
frame. For example, in the Religious Technology Center v. Lerma cases,172 
Religious Technology Center (RTC), the exclusive licensee to Hubbard’s 
writings, sued both a former Scientology member who posted various 
“Advanced Training” materials online, as well as the Washington Post for 
quoting from these materials in its reporting. These materials described “a 
detailed program for warding off the[] evil influences” of extraterrestrial 
spirits; Church doctrine flatly forbade disclosure of these materials to non-
members.173 
With respect to its claims against the Washington Post, the Church’s 
arguments—and the court’s rejection of them—candidly engaged with the 
noneconomic motivations behind the lawsuit. The Church argued that 
publication of the documents threatened “irreversible alteration of 
religious beliefs, including compelled annihilation of a core belief,”174 and 
would result in “devastating, cataclysmic spiritual harm.”175 The court 
flatly refused to allow copyright law to suppress the Post’s reporting on 
these bases, and it found fair use: 
Were they arguing to a religious council placed within a 
theocratic government, RTC’s arguments might prevail. But this 
Court is a secular branch of a secular democratic government. Our 
traditional separation of church from the state, combined with the 
heterogeneity of religious practices in this country compel us to 
reject the RTC’s arguments . . . . RTC may not employ the 
machinery of this Court to enforce its religious prescriptions 
against The Post by enjoining otherwise permissible activity.176 
Rejecting the “spiritual harm” argument, the court emphasized, “[t]he 
First Amendment represents a conscious and explicit trade-off which the 
Founding Fathers made between paternalistic protection from ‘harmful’ 
                                                     
171. See generally Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’ns Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231 
(N.D. Cal. 1995); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.Net, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519 (D. Colo. 1995); Bridge 
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Vien, 827 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Cal. 1993); New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 
F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989); New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990). 
172. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma (Lerma I), 897 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Va. 1995); Religious 
Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma (Lerma II), 908 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Va. 1995); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma 
(Lerma III), 908 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Va. 1995); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma (Lerma IV), No. 95-
1107-A, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15454 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 1996). 
173. See Lerma IV, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15454, at *3.  
174. Lerma II, 908 F. Supp. at 1356.  
175. Id. at 1357. 
176. Id. at 1356. 
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thoughts and free access to information.”177 Even though the materials in 
question were previously unpublished, they were not disclosed by the 
Washington Post in an effort to deprive the Church of the economically 
valuable right of first publication,178 or to “avoid payment of a royalty.”179 
It accordingly was “doubtful” that there would be any negative effect on 
the value of the training documents.180 The Lerma II Court expressly 
engaged with the Church’s religious and reputational interests and 
dismissed them against the overriding interests in free speech and secular 
government; it did not flatly declare that the Church’s concerns were 
beyond the reach of copyright—it instead acknowledged a hierarchy of 
values baked into our constitutional system.181 As discussed further in 
Part III, copyright law can benefit greatly from such transparent balancing 
of interests. 
The same court, nonetheless, took a remarkably different approach with 
respect to the Church’s claims against Arnaldo Lerma, the former 
Scientologist who posted full copies of the training documents online: 
“The full record clearly shows that Lerma’s motives, unlike those of news 
reporters, were not neutral and that his postings were not done primarily 
‘for public benefit.’”182 Even though Lerma argued that he was engaged 
in extensive research and commentary about the Church, “[t]hat argument 
does not justify the wholesale copying and republication of copyrighted 
material.”183 Moreover, even though the Church “never intends to 
publish”184 its confidential training documents, and the evidence of 
potential market harm was “speculative,”185 the court concluded that the 
right of first publication “encompasses [also] the choice whether to 
publish at all.”186 Quoting Salinger v. Random House, the court explained, 
“[p]otential harm to value of plaintiff’s works ‘is not lessened by the fact 
                                                     
177. Id. at 1357. 
178. See Lerma I, 897 F. Supp. 260, 264 (E.D. Va. 1995).  
179. Lerma III, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1366 (E.D. Va. 1995).  
180. Lerma II, 908 F. Supp. at 1358. Moreover, to the extent that plaintiffs were concerned with 
“potential loss of new parishioners” and the competition from “splinter groups,” the court countered 
that “this is the price paid in a free society which encourages an open marketplace for ideas.” Id. 
181. Id. 1357. 
182. Lerma IV, No. 95-1107-A, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15454, at *14 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 1996). 
183. Id. at *15. 
184. Id. at *21. 
185. Id. at *30. 
186. Id. at *21 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985)). 
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that their author has disavowed any intention to publish them during his 
lifetime . . . he is entitled to protect his opportunity to sell his letters.’”187 
In addition to its strikingly differing treatment of the Church’s “choice 
whether to publish,” the Lerma Court’s previous First Amendment 
concerns largely disappeared. 188 The most striking example appears in the 
court’s rejection of Lerma’s copyright misuse claim: 
[A] misuse is quite distinct from the legitimate invocation of 
one’s copyright even though prompted by ulterior motives. To 
misuse a copyright, therefore, the copyright owner must use the 
copyright in an impermissible way by ‘extending his monopoly 
or otherwise violating the public policy underlying copyright 
law.’ Lerma fails to make such a showing . . . . Lerma’s 
infringement is unmistakable, and RTC’s opposition is sound.189 
Unlike in its earlier decisions focused on the Post, the court only 
obliquely references the “motives” of Lerma (“not neutral”) and RTC 
(“ulterior”), but does not spell out what is really going on in the case—a 
former Scientologist sought vengeance against his former denomination, 
and that denomination used copyright laws to keep its teachings secret.190 
When the Church loses, the court is upfront about free speech outweighing 
religious interests, and it characterizes the Church’s motivations as 
“reprehensible.”191 Yet when the Church wins, and its “opposition is 
sound,”192 the court obfuscates the Church’s religious interests behind an 
“opportunity to sell” its documents.193 
Several other decisions similarly hide religious disputes behind a 
façade of economic interests. In Peter Letterese & Associates, Inc. v. 
World Institute of Scientology Enterprises, International,194 a former 
                                                     
187. Id. (quoting Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
188. Id.  
189. Id. at *34–35 (quoting Nat’l Cable Television v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 614, 652 
(D.D.C.1991)). 
190. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1243 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995) (downplaying former Scientologist’s motivation in posting Hubbard texts to a newsgroup: 
“Because there is insufficient evidence to support plaintiffs’ claim that Erlich’s copying was made 
out of spite or for other destructive reasons, the court will assume Erlich’s intended purpose was 
criticism or comment.”). 
191. Lerma III, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D. Va. 1995) (“[T]he Court finds that the motivation 
of plaintiff in filing this lawsuit against The Post is reprehensible. Although the RTC brought the 
complaint under traditional secular concepts of copyright and trade secret law, it has become clear 
that a much broader motivation prevailed—the stifling of criticism and dissent of the religious 
practices.”). 
192. Lerma IV, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15454, at *34. 
193. Id. at *21 (quoting Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2nd Cir. 1987)). 
194. 533 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008). 
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Scientologist gave the Church of Scientology a taste of its own copyright 
medicine. Peter Letterese was a Scientology member for over two 
decades, and he held several positions within the Church before he was 
excommunicated in 1994 for “violating certain Church policies.”195 
Shortly before his excommunication, however, Letterese’s company, 
Peter Letterese & Associates (PL&A), acquired the exclusive rights in the 
book Big League Sales, which had been incorporated in the Church’s 
training materials for its “registrars.” PL&A withdrew Big League Sales 
from publication and ultimately sued the Church and several affiliates for 
copyright infringement. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s 
finding of fair use.196 Even though PL&A had conceded that it “‘[has] 
never made a sale, [and is] never going to make a sale.’ . . . [s]such a 
concession . . . falls short of establishing that the intrinsic value of the 
copyright is zero.”197 “Even an author who ha[s] disavowed any intention 
to publish his work during his lifetime . . . has the right to change his 
mind.’ . . . ’[T]he copyright law must respect that creative and economic 
choice.’”198 According to the court, “the decision to withdraw a work from 
the market and then rerelease it can be a valuable marketing tool—taking 
advantage of timing and pent-up market demand.”199 
As much as the Eleventh Circuit persisted in framing PL&A’s interest 
in economic terms, its decisions with respect to Big League Sales cannot 
plausibly have anything to do with the “creative and economic” decisions 
of an author or publisher. Letterese acquired rights in a book he had shown 
zero interest in commercially exploiting, and the entity holding such rights 
was—as noted in footnote 33 of the opinion—in the business of “dental 
consulting.”200 Two weeks after his Eleventh Circuit victory, Letterese 
sued the Church for $250 million in RICO violations, alleging that it was 
a “crime syndicate.”201 It accordingly is highly unlikely that his copyright 
                                                     
195. Id. at 1295–96. 
196. Id. at 1323. 
197. Id. at 1316–17 (quoting Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enter., 
Int’l, No. 04-61178-CIV-HUCK/SIMONTON, 2005 WL 8167095, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2005), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded sub nom. Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of 
Scientology Enter., Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008)). 
198. Id. at 1317 (first quoting Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 
1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000); and then quoting Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 
132, 146 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
199. Id. at 1314. 
200. Id. at 1316 n.33. 
201. Graham Smith, Tom Cruise Named in $250 Million Scientology Racketeering Lawsuit, DAILY 
MAIL (July. 31, 2008), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-1040182/Tom-Cruise-named-
250-million-Scientology-racketeering-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/T9U7-3ASF]. 
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lawsuit had anything to do with a financial interest in exploiting a creative 
work. The Eleventh Circuit nonetheless blessed Letterese’s personal, 
religious dispute by framing it as an “economic choice”202 and a marketing 
tool.203 
The Church of Scientology is not the only religious organization to, at 
times, be throttled by market gibberish.204 For example, in Worldwide 
Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, 205 a church was able to 
use copyright law to suppress the racist ideology espoused by a rival sect’s 
core documents. The Worldwide Church of God’s founder, Herbert 
Armstrong, had written the book Mystery of the Ages shortly before his 
death in 1986.206 The book had expounded “outdated views that were 
racist in nature,” prompting the Worldwide Church (which inherited 
Armstrong’s copyright interest) to withdraw it from circulation shortly 
after his death.207 Beginning in 1989, however, two former Worldwide 
Church ministers founded the Philadelphia Church of God, which strictly 
followed Armstrong’s teachings, and began distributing unauthorized 
copies of Mystery of the Ages.208 The Ninth Circuit rejected Philadelphia 
Church’s fair use defense. Even though Worldwide Church had failed to 
exploit the book for ten years and lacked a “concrete plan to publish a new 
version,” this did not mean that the book “has no economic value”; once 
again, an author “has the right to change his mind” and eventually publish 
the work.209 The court acknowledged that religious organizations may not 
be motivated by strictly financial interests, but it nonetheless characterizes 
Mystery of the Ages as a “marketing device” to evangelize new 
members.210 The alleged infringement could, according to the court 
“divert[] potential members and contributions” away from Worldwide 
                                                     
202. Peter Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1317 (quoting Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Grp., 
150 F.3d 132, 146 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
203. Peter Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1317. 
204. See also Soc’y of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 
2012) (finding copyright infringement when one Eastern Orthodox monastery posted to the Internet 
a set of religious texts translated into English by a rival monastery).  
205. 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000). 
206. Id. at 1113. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 1119. 
210. Id. (“Those rewards need not be limited to monetary rewards; compensation may take a variety 
of forms.”); see also Soc’y of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29, 64 
(1st Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Copyright Act looks beyond monetary or commercial value and considers 
other forms of compensation for a work.”). 
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Church.211 Framing this dispute as about economics and marketing 
entirely overlooks what was really going on in Worldwide Church of 
God—two rival religious sects were fighting over the continued validity 
of their founder’s racist views, and copyright allowed one sect to 
prevail.212 As abhorrent as Armstrong’s views may have been, it is 
impossible to understand this dispute as economic, and not ideological. 
The religious dispute cases show that copyright caselaw provides a 
ready supply of market rhetoric that can be deployed to achieve distinctly 
noneconomic ends—e.g. stifling criticism, countering opposing views, 
and hindering evangelism. Each of these motivations can be reframed as 
merely a strategic marketing decision “whether to publish” a work—a 
rational business decision that downstream users reliant on a work are 
forced to respect. Market gibberish in these cases both raises serious First 
Amendment concerns for minority religious groups213 and buries the 
political work—both progressive and conservative—that copyright law is 
doing in these cases. Copyright law outright celebrates free speech and 
free exercise in the moments when it rejects the expansion of religious 
copyright interests against institutions like the Washington Post. Yet when 
courts allow such invocations, they profess to zealously adhere to 
copyright orthodoxy while simultaneously converting the parties’ 
religious fervor into rational economic choices. 
D. Political Opponents 
Even when copyright is invoked in unquestionably political disputes, 
courts nonetheless still resort to market gibberish. Politicians or political 
organizations frequently use copyrighted works either to promote their 
position or to critique their opponents, and the owners of those works 
often stridently object to their use in furtherance of a cause they do not 
support.214 Yet rarely, if ever, are the copyright objections expressly 
                                                     
211. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1119. 
212. See id. at 1125 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (“In this lawsuit, WCG appears less interested in 
protecting its rights to exploit MOA than in suppressing Armstrong’s ideas which now run counter to 
church doctrine.”). 
213. See Thomas F. Cotter, Gutenberg’s Legacy: Copyright, Censorship, and Religious Pluralism, 
91 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 330 (2003) (“A growing number of cases nevertheless show how copyright 
can impact religious practice, how legal institutions arguably exhibit bias against minority religions, 
and how a consideration of copyright doctrines in novel contexts can illuminate aspects of those 
doctrines that may be important in other contexts as well.”). 
214. See John Tehranian, The New Censorship, 101 IOWA L. REV 245 (2015) (collecting examples) 
[hereinafter Tehranian, The New Censorship]; Steve Knopper, Why Politicians Keep Using Songs 
Without Artists’ Permissions, ROLLING STONE (July 9, 2015), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/why-politicians-keep-using-songs-without-artists-
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framed in terms of underlying beliefs—doing so would immediately 
trigger core First Amendment concerns. Indeed, courts have in several 
cases found fair use based upon political speech.215 Instead, copyright 
owners—and some receptive courts—take part in the disingenuous 
posturing of market gibberish: licensing deals that will never happen and 
“rights to change their mind” that will never be exercised. For example, 
when a former member of the band Survivor sued Newt Gingrich for using 
“Eye of the Tiger” in his rallies, he explained that “a song could lose value 
if it became entwined in the public’s mind with the politician . . . . ‘My 
motives have nothing to do with politics . . . . I’m just exercising the laws 
of this great country.’”216 Although his copyright patriotism may be 
admirable, copyright law can provide this and other rights holders the 
ability to mask their dislike for certain people behind the façade of money 
and lost revenue streams. 
Republican politicians have fared particularly poorly in their efforts to 
use copyrighted content.217 Although the vast majority of such complaints 
have resulted in settlement in the artist’s favor,218 Henley v. DeVore219 
shows how market gibberish can facilitate politically-motivated disputes 
                                                     
permission-36386/ [https://perma.cc/K944-W8BL]; James C. McKinley, Jr., G.O.P. Candidates Are 
Told, Don’t Use the Verses, It’s Not Your Song, NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 3, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/04/arts/music/romney-and-gingrich-pull-songs-after-
complaints.html [https://perma.cc/QWH3-CSRE].  
215. See, e.g., Galvin v. Ill. Republican Party, 130 F. Supp. 3d 1187, 1197 (N.D. Ill. 2015) 
(“Plaintiffs’ only argument related to market effect is that Defendants’ political commentary harms 
the reputation of Mr. Galvin’s subjects and thus the value of his photographs. Avoiding this result is 
simply not a purpose of copyright law.”); Dhillon v. Doe, No. C 13-01465 SI, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
24676, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014) (“[T]he defendant used the headshot photo as part of its 
criticism of, and commentary on, the plaintiff’’s politics. Such a use is precisely what the Copyright 
Act envisions as a paradigmatic fair use.”); see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 
796 F.2d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding fair use where “the Defendants used the copies to 
generate moral outrage against their ‘enemies’ and thus stimulate monetary support for their political 
cause”); Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 868 F. Supp. 2d 962 
(C.D. Cal. 2012) (finding fair use of a pro-choice video by a group opposing abortion); Savage v. 
Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, Inc., No. C 07-6076 SI, 2008 WL 2951281, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 
25, 2008) (“[P]laintiff admits that the effect of defendants’’ usage is limited to the public criticism 
and condemnation of the ideas within the original work, not market damage in the economic sense.”). 
216. McKinley, supra note 214 (quoting Interview with Frankie Sullivan, former Survivor band 
member). 
217. See Knopper, supra note 214 (“Mick Fleetwood recently said Bill Clinton’s campaign never 
requested permission for what became his iconic 1992 campaign anthem, ‘Don’t Stop,’ but the band 
generally voted Democratic and didn’t object to the exposure . . . . ’If it wasn’t Hillary, and I didn’t 
necessarily agree with their stance, it’d definitely be an awkward position.’” (quoting interview with 
Travie McCoy, Band Member, Gym Class Heroes)). 
218. See id.; Tehranian, The New Censorship, supra note 214 (documenting successful DMCA 
takedowns of political opposition). 
219. Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
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if they end up in front of a judge. In 2009, a Republican 
Assemblymember, Charles DeVore, ran political advertisements critical 
of Barack Obama, Nancy Pelosi, and Barbara Boxer; these ads rewrote 
the lyrics of Henley’s songs “The Boys of Summer” and “All She Wants 
to Do is Dance” in order to convey this message.220 The court rejected 
DeVore’s fair use defense. 221 Even though DeVore argued that “there is 
no market for licensed use of the works because the Plaintiffs refuse to 
license their works,”222 the court extended to Henley “the right to change 
his mind”223 and eventually grant such license, even though there was no 
evidence that this would ever occur.224 Henley further bolstered this 
potential market interests through hiring an expert, who testified that 
“licensees and advertisers do not like to use songs that are already 
associated with a particular product or cause.”225 The court agreed that 
“advertisers would be deterred from using the [Henley’s] music because 
it has been used before, not because of the particular association with 
DeVore’s message . . . . This injury is the very essence of market 
substitution.226 Don Henley was able to use copyright law to frustrate the 
campaign of a California republican he did not support,227 and he was able 
to achieve this political end through reframing his political opposition as 
preserving an implausible licensing market.228 
When a California Republican was on the other side of the battlefield, 
however, the court was far less willing to entertain a potential market 
                                                     
220. Id. at 1148; see also Browne v. McCain, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (rejecting 
motion to dismiss Jackson Browne’s copyright claim against John McCain’s presidential campaign). 
221. Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1162–63. 
222. Id. at 1162. 
223. Id. (quoting Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th 
Cir. 2000)). 
224. Id. at 1162. 
225. Id. at 1163. 
226. Id. 
227. Henley has long been active in left-leaning political causes. See, e.g., Lars Brandle, Don Henly 
Calls Out Donald Trump Twice on ‘The Late Show’, BILLBOARD (Sept. 22, 2015), 
https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/6700847/don-henley-onald-trump-late-show 
[https://perma.cc/KRA4-AE3W]. 
228. See Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Property and 
Free Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 25 (2013) (“It seems unlikely that, by using his songs in 
videos satirizing Democratic politicians, DeVore somehow harmed Henley economically.”); Laura 
A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the Interests of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1341, 1403 
(2011) (observing that musicians can rely on the market effects fair use factor “to argue that uses that 
are inconsistent with the plaintiff’s current reputational status will have an economic effect on the 
plaintiff’s ability to license or sell copies of the work in the future”). 
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interest. In Dhillon v. Does 1-10,229 Harmeet Dhillon, the Chairman of the 
state Republican Party had commissioned a headshot in connection with 
her campaign for California State Assembly, and she sued for 
infringement when the headshot was posted on a website critical of her 
political associations.230 In trying to establish market harm from the 
posting, she made several arguments that previously had persuaded courts 
to acknowledge a potential market. She argued that she “used the headshot 
photo as a tool to positively market herself,”231 echoing the “marketing 
tool” arguments successfully used in Worldwide Church of God and Peter 
Letterese & Associates. She also argued that the photograph “has been 
tainted with a prior negative association,”232 echoing the concerns of Don 
Henley’s expert. Nonetheless, the court found the posting to be a 
“paradigmatic fair use.”233 In contrast to many of the cases above, the 
court emphasized that she never “sought or received a licensing fee from 
anyone at any time in connection with the use of the headshot 
photo . . . plaintiff fails to allege that she ever attempted to sell the 
headshot photo at any time in the past, or that she had any plans to attempt 
to do so in the future.”234 
The court in Dhillon might have extended to plaintiff the “right to 
choose” when and whether to license her headshot, but it ultimately chose 
not to deploy market gibberish in her favor. This decision might 
legitimately have been due to the core political speech presented in this 
case—indeed, this case standing on its own seems entirely justified by the 
free speech commitments of the fair use doctrine. When compared with 
many of the other cases surveyed above, however, it is difficult to discern 
precisely why Harmeet Dhillon does not get to control highly implausible 
potential markets while Don Henley does. Is it because of Henley’s 
celebrity status? Is it because of the marginal role of Republicans in 
California? If the presiding judge opposed the political message of the 
defendants, would the result have been different?235 When courts 
discriminately lean on potential markets to distinguish between infringing 
and fair uses, it becomes difficult to tell whether the resulting doctrinal 
                                                     
229.  Dhillon v. Doe, No. C 13-01465 SI, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24676, at *1–15 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 
25, 2014). 
230. Id. 
231. Id. at *14. 
232. Id.  
233. Id. at *15. 
234. Id. at *18. 
235. See, e.g., Hill v. Pub. Advocate of the U.S., 35 F. Supp. 3d 1347 (D. Colo. 2014) (denying 
motion to dismiss copyright claim by wedding photographer whose photos of a gay couple were used 
in political advocacy in opposition to same-sex marriage). 
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lines reflect a reasoned hierarchy of free speech interests or instead simply 
mirror the relative economic and political power of the parties. 
E. Remedies for Emotional Distress 
The cases surveyed in the previous subsections demonstrate that, 
notwithstanding courts’ insistence that copyright is a purely economic 
right, copyright holders routinely vindicate noneconomic interests 
through infringement actions. But what happens next? As litigation shifts 
away from questions of liability, how does market gibberish translate into 
remedies? 
With respect to injunctive relief, copyright law has struggled in recent 
years to identify what in particular constitutes sufficient irreparable harm 
to enjoin dissemination of a work.236 If copyright infringement is a 
violation of primarily an economic interest, then monetary relief would 
seem to map onto plaintiff’s injury more directly than injunctive relief, 
even if the precise amount of money is difficult to calculate. Courts have 
nonetheless adopted a few strategies in order to maintain the market-based 
nature of irreparable injury.237 First, they characterize copyright as 
“principally, a property interest in the copyrighted material,” and from 
this property classification reflexively flows injunctive relief.238 Second, 
the copyright injury is reframed as almost trademark-like; the 
infringement has created “market confusion.”239 Third, courts insist that 
“prov[ing] the loss of sales due to infringement is . . . notoriously 
difficult.”240 And finally, they have obliquely observed that a copyright 
holder has a “First Amendment interest in not speaking” that would be 
                                                     
236. See generally Andrew Gilden, Copyright Essentialism and the Performativity of Remedies, 54 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123 (2013).  
237. See Christopher Buccafusco & David Fagundes, The Moral Psychology of Copyright 
Infringement, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2433, 2442 (2016) (“[I]njunctive relief made available by copyright 
law is intended to prevent irreparable monetary harm caused by the possibility of further 
infringement.”). 
238. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 81 (2d. Cir. 2010); see also eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 
388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (explaining the long history of injunctive relief in IP cases 
“given the difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies that allow an infringer 
to use an invention against the patentee’s wishes.”). 
239. Colting, 607 F.3d at 81 (citing Merkos L’Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 
312 F.3d 94, 96-97 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
240. Omega Importing Corp. v. Petri-Kine Camera Co., 451 F.2d 1190, 1195 (2d Cir. 1971); see 
Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the Interests of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1341, 
1402 (2011) (“Artists may, therefore, use copyright law to assert what is essentially a trademark-
related claim—in other words, they use their ability to control the exploitation of the work to challenge 
uses that suggest an authorization or sponsorship of the message conveyed by the defendant’s use.”). 
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irreparably injured through continued unauthorized use of their work.241 
Each of these three strategies are sufficiently vague, flexible, and/or 
market-oriented to accommodate noneconomic interests without 
expressly acknowledging them: undesired political associations create 
market confusion, an author’s right to choose when to publish dovetails 
nicely with a right not to speak, and it will, of course, be difficult to 
calculate lost sales from potential markets that will never exist. 
With respect to monetary relief, courts are similarly able to squeeze 
noneconomic harms into an economic framework. As a preliminary 
matter, the Copyright Act provides statutory damages for works that were 
timely registered, seemingly giving courts substantial wiggle room in 
awarding damages without precise calculation. Nonetheless, with respect 
to both statutory and actual damages,242 almost all courts have held that 
emotional distress damages are unavailable under the Copyright Act,243 
even for violations of visual artists’ limited moral rights.244 In Núñes v. 
Rushton,245 for example, the court denied an award of actual damages 
solely based on the “mental anguish”246 that a romance novel author 
experienced from the infringement of her work.247 In addition to surveying 
                                                     
241. Colting, 607 F.3d at 81 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985)). 
242. See Buccafusco & Fagundes, supra note 237, at 2442 (“[S]tatutory damages are still generally 
intended to serve as a means of protecting the markets of copyrighted works because actual damages 
are hard to measure and infringement is difficult to deter.”). 
243. See Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F.3d 909, 917 (9th Cir. 2002) (observing that “hurt feelings” are 
not compensable under the Copyright Act); Stern v. Does, 978 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1050 (C.D. Cal. 
2011); Kelley v. Universal Music Grp., No. 14 Civ. 2968(PAE), 2015 WL 6143737 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 
19, 2015). But see Smith v. NBC Universal, 06 Civ. 5350 (SAS), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13280, at 
*7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2008) (“I conclude that damages for emotional harm may be recovered in a 
copyright action, though only where such harm is foreseeable.”). 
244. The Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) gives rights of attribution and integrity to certain visual 
artists. Such moral rights might seem to open the door for emotional distress and reputational 
damages. However, VARA provides damages under “the same standards that the courts presently 
use” under traditional copyright law rendering emotional damages unrecoverable. H.R. Rep. No. 101-
514, at 21–22 (1990). See Cohen v. G&M Realty, 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 422 n.18 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(“Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to damages for emotional distress. Under traditional 
copyright law, plaintiffs cannot recover such damages.”). But see Hanrahan v. Ramirez, No. 2:97-
CV-7479 RAP RC., 1998 WL 34369997, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 3, 1998) (“Plaintiff’s request for 
$100,000 in actual damages to reflect the loss of reputation and emotional distress is excessive, 
although some relief is certainly warranted.”). 
245. Núñes v. Rushton, 299 F. Supp. 3d 1216 (D. Utah 2018). 
246. Id. at 1226 (“Núñes does not argue that the infringement caused the sales of her existing novels 
to suffer. Nor does Núñes contend that Rushton obtained any ill-gotten gains that must be disgorged 
because Rushton never sold any copies of her infringing novel to the public. Instead, Núñes alleges 
that Rushton’s copyright infringement caused her mental anguish.”).  
247. Id. at 1225. It is unclear how this lack of economic injury would play out in a fair use analysis, 
as the court held that the defendant had waived the affirmative defense. 
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existing case law and commentary, the court looked to the purpose 
animating the statute to decide whether actual damages under the 
Copyright Act included emotional distress. Unlike the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act or the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, both of which allow 
emotional distress damages, “[n]o such purpose to protect consumers, 
prevent discrimination, or eradicate racial prejudice can be attributed to 
the Copyright Act.”248 The purportedly limited policy reach of the 
copyright laws accordingly limited actual damages to redressing 
economic injuries. 
This does not mean, however, that noneconomic injuries are actually 
off the table. In Smith v. NBC Universal, 249 for example, the plaintiff was 
attacked by an orca whale at Sea World in 1987. 250 The attack was video-
recorded, and the author of the video gifted all rights to Smith while he 
was in the hospital recovering. Smith granted licenses to two news 
organizations in 1987 and 1988 to help fund his litigation against Sea 
World, but he then spent the next two decades trying to prevent other news 
and entertainment programs from airing the video.251 In his successful 
lawsuit against NBC Universal, Smith “claim[ed] that the broadcast of the 
Video caused him emotional harm, and [he] seeks to redress such 
harm.”252 Smith admitted that he “has no plans to market the Video and it 
is not immediately clear that defendants profited substantially from their 
violation of Smith’s copyright.”253 The court rejected Smith’s request for 
emotional distress damages, but concluded that “Smith can prove his 
damages in [] other ways” such as by demonstrating “the fair market price 
that defendants would have had to pay had they attempted to license the 
Video.”254 Smith had no desire to ever license his video ever again, but he 
was entitled to monetary relief in the amount he would be able to obtain 
should he change his mind. Smith could seek compensation for an 
economic injury he would never in fact experience, “[b]ut he cannot argue 
that statutory damages should be based on the emotional harm he suffered 
as a result of the broadcast.”255 As a result, the damages phase of the trial 
focused on calculating a market-based harm that Smith had expressly 
                                                     
248. Id. at 1228–29. 
249. 524 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
252. Smith v. NBC Universal, No. 06Civ.5350(SAS), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13280, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2008). 
253. Id.  
254. Id. at *9. 
255. Id. 
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declared had nothing to do with his motivations in bringing his lawsuit.256 
Market gibberish accordingly has seeped into all stages of copyright 
litigation. If a plaintiff seeks, for example, to protect their sexual privacy 
or stop the spread of racist spiritual texts, liability will hinge upon some 
history of licensing or some plausible market demand that a court can slide 
into a narrative of economic incentives and harm. If the same plaintiff 
seeks to enjoin the disputed use of a copyrighted work, they must continue 
to tell a tale about irreparably damaged market opportunities. And if they 
seek compensation for privacy or dignitary invasions, they must be able 
to place some dollar amount on the materials they never intend to sell. 
The rhetoric and the reality of copyright law ultimately fail to match.257 
Courts repeatedly insist that copyright law does not protect privacy, or 
redress emotional harms, or “coddle artistic vanity,”258 or take sides in 
ideological disputes. This, ultimately, is just not true. Copyright law is 
enmeshed in a diverse range of contemporary social and political disputes, 
and the large body of cases surveyed above refutes any claim to the 
contrary. By engaging in market gibberish, courts are able to avoid 
confronting the actual role of copyright law in contemporary society while 
doing a tremendous amount of normative work under the radar. Courts, 
scholars, and advocates may want copyright law to stay within its 
traditionally narrow lane of commercial authorship and publishing, but 
the system’s coherence, predictability, and fairness require 
acknowledging the work that copyright jurisprudence is actually doing. 
Copyright’s economic framework frequently contorts to redress a broad 
range of noneconomic concerns, but it does not do so consistently, and it 
does not do so for everyone. 
ii. Economics and Emotions in Copyright 
The previous Part demonstrated serious flaws and inconsistencies in 
courts’ analyses of copyright markets, but this is not the first Article to 
critique how courts assess the impact of a disputed use on a copyright 
owner’s actual or potential markets. In particular, numerous scholars have 
critiqued the speculative, incomplete, and circular nature of courts’ 
analyses of the fourth fair use—the “market effects”—factor. The analysis 
                                                     
256. Id. at *9–20; see Smith v. NBC Universal, 524 F. Supp. 2d 315, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Smith 
has indicated that he suffered no economic damage.”). 
257. See Stewart Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197 (1996) 
(arguing that the rhetoric of economic incentives and authorial labor have expanded copyright 
protections far longer and broader than either of those narratives requires). 
258. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 81 n.9 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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is speculative in that courts sometimes find a harm to an alleged market 
without actual proof of lost sales or concrete plans to enter a derivative 
market.259 The analysis is incomplete in that it only considers the market 
“harm” from the disputed use, and not the potential market “help” that 
might come from increased publicity or wider access to the work.260 And 
the analysis is circular in that market harm can be shown based upon the 
loss of a license fee from the disputed use, when such a license is only 
needed if a court finds the disputed use to be infringing.261 Many of the 
cases above exhibit these traits—they recognize markets that are highly 
unlikely to ever form,262 they disallow uses that might enhance the 
marketability of a work,263 or they base market harm entirely on the 
defendant’s failure to pay.264 
The above cases, however, exhibit another set of traits that tends to be 
                                                     
259. See, e.g., Bohannan, Harmless Speech, supra note 8, at 1098 (“[N]either the copyright statute 
nor the case law currently requires adequate proof of harm to avoid or minimize conflicts with the 
First Amendment.”); Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REV. 609, 
657 (2006) (“When it comes to derivative markets, owning a copyright means having the exclusive 
right to use the work in markets that one chooses to enter or not, to use the work in ways both foreseen 
and unforeseen. With enough imagination, judges can find harm in almost any use, however remote 
from the market for the original work.”). For an example of such speculative analysis, see Castle Rock 
Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998). 
260. See, e.g., Fagundes, supra note 8, at 362 (“[R]ather than interpret the Copyright Act’s factor-
four inquiry as the statute apparently mandates—to include consideration of all economic effects of 
the use, good and bad alike—courts (as well as commentators and practitioners) . . . . have interpreted 
it to require consideration only of market harm, not market help.”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Market Effects 
Bearing Upon Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 615, 629 (2015) (arguing that “market benefits ought to 
be considered as relevant market effects alongside market harms”). For an example of a case 
excluding market benefits, see UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Any allegedly positive impact of defendant’s activities on plaintiffs’ prior market 
in no way frees defendant to usurp a further market that directly derives from reproduction of the 
plaintiffs’ copyrighted works.”). 
261. See, e.g., Bohannan, Harmless Speech, supra note 8, at 1099 (“[T]here is a potential for 
circularity in the definition: a copyright holder can always argue that the defendant’s use caused her 
harm (and therefore is not fair) because the defendant could have paid her a license fee for any 
unauthorized use; yet, if the use is deemed fair, then no payment is required.”); Lemley, supra note 
19, at 189 (“[C]ourts began to count as market harm not just actual lost sales of the copyrighted work 
or plausible derivative works, but also the loss of money they supposed users would pay to license 
the right to use the copyrighted work.”); Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach 
to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 39 (1997) 
(“Consideration of the permission fees allegedly ‘lost’ in determining whether a use is a fair use is 
inappropriate because no fees are required unless the use is not a fair use.”). 
262. See supra notes 219–228 and accompanying text (discussing Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 
2d 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2010)).  
263. See supra notes 238–241 and accompanying text (discussing Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 
(2d Cir. 2010)). 
264. See supra notes 205–212 and accompanying text (discussing Worldwide Church of God v. 
Phila. Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000)).  
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overlooked in scholarly critiques. Case law addressing dubious market 
interests is not uniformly speculative, incomplete, or circular; it is 
selectively so. The trouble with market gibberish is not just that each 
decision’s analysis is internally flawed. The larger problem is that courts 
sometimes deploy market gibberish to allow a noneconomic claim to 
proceed, but then refuse to extend the same analysis to claims motivated 
by nearly identical interests. Courts are nowhere near uniformly charitable 
in their willingness to contort market interests in favor of a finding of 
infringement—they instead do so when an often-unstated mix of policy 
concerns point in favor of infringement and the plaintiff can manufacture 
some plausible story of economic harm. When the policy balance points 
in another direction—for example, when the defendant is a news 
organization—courts cut the market gibberish and scrutinize the 
purported economic harm quite closely. Accordingly, it is important both 
to investigate the policy choices behind courts’ invocation of market 
gibberish—i.e. why did the court bend market rhetoric in plaintiff’s 
favor—and to ask what sorts of parties are able to take advantage of it—
i.e. who can most plausibly tell a story of an economic interest in copyright 
protection. 
Because of the opacity and selectivity of market gibberish, this Article 
diverges with the vast majority of previous scholarly critiques. Most 
scholars have responded to speculative, incomplete, and circular 
reasoning by doubling down on the role of markets in copyright law—
they argue that courts should more rigorously screen copyright assertions 
to make sure that the copyright owners’ financial interests have been 
harmed and accordingly that their economic incentives have been 
impacted by unauthorized copying. Numerous scholars have argued that 
copyright owners must empirically demonstrate that the defendant 
financially harmed them in a way that was reasonably foreseeable.265 If 
                                                     
265. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 1569, 1605 (2009) (“The requirement of ‘foreseeable copying’ would ask whether the 
defendant’s use (that is, copying) of the protected work was foreseeable to the plaintiff—in form and 
purpose—when the work was created.” (emphasis in original)); Christina Bohannan, Copyright, 
Foreseeability, and Fair Use, supra note 8, at 1025 (“At the very least, the Dr. Seuss court should 
have required the plaintiff to provide concrete evidence of market harm, showing that it has licensed 
such works in the past or that it had immediate plans to do so. If the plaintiff could not provide such 
evidence, the use should have been deemed fair.” (emphasis in original)); Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark 
A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1255 (2014) 
(arguing copyright should never allow an infringement claim to succeed absent market substitution 
because “a use that does not interfere with the plaintiff’’s market in some way generally does no 
relevant harm.”); Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 
25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1188 (2010) (recommending “that copyright owners be required to 
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there is no history of exploiting a particular market, and no reasonably 
concrete plan to do so, then the disputed use generally should fall outside 
the boundaries of copyright infringement. Several other scholars have 
further argued that courts should consider both market harm and market 
“help,” i.e. the total effects of the disputed use on plaintiff’s economic 
interests.266 If the use does not negatively impact, or if it even improves, 
the market value of the copyrighted work, then this positive impact should 
weigh in favor of fair use. Both of these approaches—ratcheting up the 
empirical burden on plaintiffs and considering the full market impact of 
the disputed use—are designed to better exclude abusive, censorial, or 
otherwise illegitimate interests from the copyright system.267 Although 
these approaches seek a more empirically-grounded and holistic 
assessment of the effects of defendant’s use, the focus nonetheless 
remains on the “pecuniary impacts” on the copyright owner.268 
Although any alleged economic harm absolutely should be empirically 
grounded, doubling down on markets alone is unlikely to make the 
copyright system fairer or more coherent. The remainder of this Part 
explains why. First, a more rigorous screening of market interests might 
have the effect of narrowing the total reach of copyright law, but it is 
unlikely to do so in a way that is distributively fair. Second, the distinction 
between market and nonmarket interests poorly tracks the underlying 
                                                     
prove commercial harm when they make claims of infringement other than those involving exact or 
near-exact copies that operate in the same market as the allegedly infringed work”). 
266. See Fagundes, supra note 8, at 386 (arguing that courts should consider “all information 
regarding the pecuniary impact of the defendant’s use into the evaluation of the final fair use factor.”); 
Fromer, supra note 8, at 618 (“[C]ourts should focus on market benefit alongside market harm in 
assessing fair use. A full-bodied assessment of the effect of a defendant’s use on a work—not merely 
its harmful effects—gets courts to look at all effects once they surpass a specified degree of 
speculativeness, be they licensing harms or sales benefits.”). 
267. See, e.g., Tehranian, The New Censorship, supra note 214, at 290 (“[C]ourts could deem a 
defendant’s actions protected under the First Amendment and immunized from copyright liability as 
a matter of law where: (1) the plaintiff lacks a legitimate economic motivation to preserve an 
established market for the licensing of its copyrighted works; and (2) the defendant’s use of the work 
at issue advances the expression of basic facts or comments on matters of public concern.”) 
268. See Bohannan, Copyright, Foreseeability, and Fair Use supra note 8, at 987 (“Consistent with 
copyright’s purpose, copyright harm should be limited to profits that would be likely to affect 
incentives to create or distribute copyrighted works”); Bohannan, Harmless Speech, supra note 8, at 
1156–57 (“[C]opyright harm clearly includes the harm of market substitution, where the defendant’s 
use of plaintiff’s copyrighted material actually supplants the market for the copyrighted work in a 
way that is likely to decrease economic incentives to create or distribute the work. By contrast, the 
First Amendment severely limits judicial recognition of nonmarket harms.”); Fagundes, supra note 
8, at 386; Fromer, supra note 8, at 642 (“Market effects are irrelevant if they are empirically 
implausible, and market effects ought to be excluded unless they are copyright-relevant.”); Lemley, 
supra note 19, at 188 (“[W]hat the doctrine really cares about [is] whether the use substitutes for the 
copyrighted work and so is likely to cost the copyright owner a sale.”). 
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concerns about abuse and censorship in the copyright system. Third, 
segregating economic and emotional interests downplays the needs and 
experiences of women, minorities, and other marginalized groups. 
A. Distributive Consequences 
First, a copyright system with a firm, exclusive commitment to market 
interests is likely to most benefit those with an undisputed licensing 
history and reasonable prospects of future revenue. In other words, 
doubling down on markets further channels copyright protections to 
celebrity authors and corporate rightsholders.269 In the cases surveyed 
above, plaintiffs are able to trigger market gibberish where they had a 
clear track record of successfully profiting off their work and accordingly 
could tell a plausible story of market harm. These include plaintiffs such 
as Don Henley, J.D. Salinger, and Bret Michaels. Whether they are 
asserting copyright in order to recoup lost profits or in opposition to uses 
they dislike, these parties have an economic track record they can wield 
to their strategic advantage.270 The “choice whether to publish” 271  a work 
in a particular context can almost always be framed in terms of a rational 
market choice, and the “right to change his mind” 272  about when to permit 
a use is fairly easily reframed as a “marketing tool.” 273 In other words, 
famous and wealthy individuals can more easily cloak themselves in 
business narratives in order to vindicate personal interests.274 Everyday 
                                                     
269. See Rebecca Tushnet, Fair Use’s Unfinished Business, 15 CHI.-KENT. J. INTELL. PROP. 399, 
409 (2016) (“Another lesson that might be taken away from Garcia, however, is that American 
copyright law hesitates to threaten large corporations.”). 
270. See Natalie M. Banta, Death and Privacy in the Digital Age, 94 N.C.L. REV. 927, 987 (2016) 
(“Therefore, digital assets that may hold noncommercial but desired information about a decedent’s 
life would not be protected on either the grounds of privacy or of copyright unless the documents, 
emails, or photos had some kind of commercial value a decedent’s family wished to control by 
asserting the decedent’s copyright.”). 
271. Lerma IV, No. 95-1107-A, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15454, at *21 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 1996). 
272. Katz v. Google Inc., 802 F.3d 1178, 1184 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted) (quoting Monge 
v. Maya Magazines Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1181 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
273. Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287, 
1314 (11th Cir. 2008). 
274. Similarly, businesses are able to cloak themselves in some of the author-centered interests 
animating the cases surveyed above in order to protect their purely economic interests. See, e.g., 
Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 145–46 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Although Castle 
Rock has evidenced little if any interest in exploiting this market for derivative works based on 
Seinfeld, such as by creating and publishing Seinfeld trivia books . . . the copyright law must respect 
that creative and economic choice.”). Video Pipeline v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, 342 F.3d 
191 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting argument that unauthorized display of movie trailers did not cause 
market harm because no one had ever paid Disney to watch those trailers, and noting that the value 
of a copyrighted work “need not be limited to monetary rewards; compensation may take a variety of 
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individuals, or struggling artists, by contrast, are far less likely to be able 
to invoke a plausible market interest to achieve the same personal ends.275 
Doubling down on market commitments in copyright law also 
particularly benefits celebrity or corporate defendants. If courts decide to 
give greater weight to the total market effects of a disputed use, and ignore 
any noneconomic interests involved in the dispute, well-known 
defendants can employ one of two strategies. They first can argue that 
they brought valuable attention to a previously unknown work, and 
therefore that they enhanced the value of that work.276 For example, after 
Elon Musk used a cartoon drawing of a “farting unicorn” in Tesla products 
and promotions—and the artist objected—Musk responded, “[h]e can sue 
for money if he wants, but that’s kinda lame. If anything, this attention 
increased his mug sales.”277 Beyoncé similarly defended her prominent 
sampling of a deceased artist’s YouTube videos; she argued that her 
(unattributed) use “‘helped (or perhaps even created) that market’ for 
Anthony Barré’s works.”278 Additionally, The Four Seasons band 
successfully invoked this “market creation” theory to justify their 
unattributed, uncompensated use of an unpublished manuscript when 
developing the musical, The Jersey Boys.279 
Celebrity defendants also might argue that there is no market harm 
from their use because they have access to a market that is practically off-
                                                     
forms.” (quoting Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 
2000))); see generally Sterk, supra note 257, at 1198 (“The beneficiaries of expanded copyright 
doctrine often are not struggling authors but faceless corporate assignees well-versed in the ways of 
the business world.”). 
275. See generally Andrew Gilden & Timothy Greene, Fair Use for the Rich and Fabulous, 80 U. 
CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 88 (2013) (comparing favorable outcome for famous author in Salinger v. 
Colting with the less favorable outcomes for lesser-known artists like the plaintiff in Cariou v. 
Prince). Religious organizations, which regularly mix economic and spiritual concerns, remain in an 
ambiguous place within more rigorously policed markets. Some of the purported economic interests 
in the above cases are quite clearly speculative or disingenuous, see Worldwide Church of God, 227 
F.3d 1110 (planning to publish annotated version of racist book), while other purported interests, such 
as with certain Scientologist texts, might be more bona fide.   
276. See Fagundes, supra note 8, at 379 (“Infringement can, however counterintuitively, serve as a source 
of publicity and drive up demand in a way that more than makes up for the lost sales of some copies.”). 
277. See Sam Levin, Elon Musk Drawn Into Farting Unicorn Dispute With Potter, THE GUARDIAN 
(June 27, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jun/27/elon-musk-farting-unicorn-
mug-cartoon-tom-edwards [https://perma.cc/KN5J-MAKW]. 
278. Estate of Barré v. Carter, 272 F. Supp. 3d 906, 917 (E.D. La. 2017). 
279. See Corbello v. DeVito, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1068-69 (D. Nev. 2017) (“The evidence at trial 
indicated that before the [Jersey Boys] Play debuted, the Work had no market value . . . . If anything, 
the Play has increased the value of the Work.”); Fagundes, supra note 8, at 382 (observing that 
unauthorized use can “reincarnate” a work “by creating visibility for a work that has fallen out of 
(and, perhaps, was never even in) the public eye”). 
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limits to the copyright owner. For example, the world-famous artist 
Richard Prince established fair use over his extensive appropriation of 
photographer Patrick Cariou’s work because Prince’s work “appeal[ed] to 
an entirely different sort of collector” than did Cariou’s.280 Prince’s work 
sold for millions of dollars at elite galleries, and hordes of celebrities 
(including Beyoncé) attended his gallery openings; Cariou, by contrast, 
had earned only $8,000 in royalties and had only sold four prints from his 
photography book, to acquaintances.281 Musk, Beyoncé, and Prince all 
likely profited significantly from their use of relatively obscure works,282 
and a market-oriented approach to fair use allows them to say either that 
they did the copyright owner a favor, or that the copyright owner never 
had a chance to compete in the first place. If any of these uses were 
ultimately deemed infringing,283 it would have to rest upon some 
additional moral or cultural concern and not the logic of market harm or 
substitution. Doubling down on markets accordingly redounds to the 
benefits of those with market power. 
B. Normative Mismatch 
Second, in addition to exacerbating distributive divides in copyright, 
doubling down on markets also fails to adequately root out abusive or 
censorial copyright assertions. As much as copyright courts and scholars 
might try to segregate legitimate market interests from illegitimate 
nonmarket interests, this segregation often poorly maps onto the 
                                                     
280. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 709 (2d Cir. 2013). 
281. Id.  
282. Advocates of the “market help” approach put forward examples such as online filesharing and 
fan fiction as examples where the defendants use could increase the value of the copyrighted work, 
which might make fair use fairer for everyday users of intellectual property. See Fagundes, supra note 
8, at 380–85. What these users probably still cannot do, however, is profit off their use, as they are 
appropriating from an author with a dominant market position. See id. at 387 (“Imagine that a small, 
rogue book publisher printed a thousand unauthorized copies of a major publishing house’s current 
bestselling novel, and that the rogue publisher then sold all the copies at cut-rate prices. Factor four 
would still favor a finding of infringement even if the court used a net market effects approach.”). 
283. Musk quickly settled his dispute. See Elon Musk Reaches New Deal with Artist in ‘Farting Unicorn’ Image 
Row, INDEPENDENT REPORTER (July 21, 2018, 10:29 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/ 
elon-musk-tesla-artist-potter-farting-unicorn-mug-image-tom-edwards-a8458096.html [https://perma.cc/T48X-
A2W5]. Beyoncé settled her dispute after a court denied her motion to dismiss. Beyoncé Settles One Lawsuit, 
Gets Hit with Another over “Formation”, THE FASHION LAW (Jan. 31, 2018), 
http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/beyonc-settles-one-lawsuit-gets-hit-with-another-over-formation 
[https://perma.cc/43SQ-TMC3]. The Second Circuit found that Richard Prince had made fair use of twenty-
five of the thirty works in dispute as a matter of law. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 712. The parties settled as to the 
remaining five works. Brian Boucher, Landmark Copyright Lawsuit Cariou v. Prince is Settled, ART IN 
AMERICA (Mar. 18, 2014), https://www.artinamericamagazine.com/news-features/news/landmark-copyright-
lawsuit-cariou-v-prince-is-settled/ [https://perma.cc/BZL4-DHVS]. 
 
07 - Gilden (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 10/21/2019  5:57 PM 
2019] COPYRIGHT’S MARKET GIBBERISH 1065 
 
underlying concerns for system abuses. On the “legitimate” side, courts 
and scholars largely agree that an author’s “right of first publication” is 
an important economic component of copyright protection, justifying at 
least some heightened protection for unpublished works as against 
putative fair uses.284 However, this “unpublished” category includes at 
least three very different categories of works: early drafts of what will 
eventually be mass publications; completed works subject to often-
lucrative early- or pre-publication agreements; and works that the author 
never intends to see the light of day.285 The first two categories can be 
justified by economic interests; the third requires market gibberish.286 
Nonetheless, courts allow the three categories of works to blend,287 
permitting authors of entirely private works—like sex tapes or private 
correspondences—to control the dissemination of works based upon a 
questionable analogy to other unpublished works.288 As Professor 
                                                     
284. See, e.g., Bohannan, Harmless Speech, supra note 8, at 1157 (“Courts should view uses of 
unpublished works very skeptically, maintaining the current rule that such uses will ordinarily be 
deemed infringing. In all other cases, courts should recognize harm only when copyright holders 
suffer monetary loss of a nature that is likely to decrease ex ante incentives to create or distribute 
copyrighted works.”); Lee, Suspect Assertions, supra note 48, at 385 (“Other uses of copyright for 
privacy beyond the right of first publication are suspect, however.”); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 2 COPYRIGHT 
PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE 191–92 (1989) (arguing that copyright protection should generally 
extend only to holders seeking monetary exploitation of the work, while observing 
that privacy interests might receive some deference in unpublished works). 
285. See, e.g., William M. Landes, Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries, and Other 
Unpublished Works: An Economic Approach, 21 J. LEGAL STUDIES 79 (1992); O’Neill, supra note 
14, at 434 (“At least three different interests underlie the right of first publication: privacy, creative 
control, and commercial exploitation of prepublication rights. Which is involved in a given case 
depends on the kind of writing involved and the author’s intention in regard to the writing.”). 
286. O’Neill, supra note 14, at 427 (“By focusing on the right of first publication, including an 
irrelevant concern for creative control, the Court nearly equates creative control over the text with 
control over marketing strategies. In so doing, the Court places a ‘penumbra’ of personal privacy and 
autonomy over a commercial conflict between two rival journals.”); id. at 434 (“Had the [C]ourt 
acknowledged these various interests, it would have recognized that Harper & Row had little 
relevance to the Salinger case.”). 
287. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 47, at 468 (“Significantly, this case had very little to do with 
privacy and a great deal to do with protecting the economic interests of authors and their publishers. 
Harper & Row did not go to court to protect the privacy of President Ford from the intrusion of The 
Nation magazine.”); Diane Conley, Author, User, Scholar, Thief: Fair Use and Unpublished Works, 
9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 15, 31–32 (1990) (closely analyzing Harper & Row v. The Nation and 
observing that “the Court may be protecting the right of first publication for reasons other than simply 
maintaining the incentive to create.”). 
288. See, e.g., Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp. (Michaels I), 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Salinger 
v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987). When courts are looking for reasons to find fair use, 
however, they will sometimes draw a distinction between the scooping of prepublication copies, as in 
Harper & Row, which cause demonstrable financial loss, and the publishing of private documents, which 
do not. See Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp. (Michaels II), 48 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1891 (C.D. Cal. 1998); 
Lerma II, 908 F. Supp. 1353, 1355, 1357 (E.D. Va. 1995). 
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Shyamkrishna Balganesh emphasizes in a forthcoming Article, common 
law rights to control the first publication of a work quite explicitly 
reflected concerns with an author’s privacy, autonomy, and dignity.289 The 
contemporary emphasis on the primacy of market interests, however, has 
blurred the diverse range of economic and noneconomic interests 
embedded in the legitimately robust protection for unpublished works. 
On the “illegitimate” side, by creating a binary between market and 
nonmarket interests, scholars too often lump all nonmarket interests 
together, regardless of their legitimacy. Certain interests that are almost 
undoubtedly illegitimate—e.g. suppressing negative reviews online or 
keeping incriminating evidence out of court—are conflated with 
important interests that copyright law may wish to vindicate—e.g. family 
privacy or sexual autonomy.290 What can result is a false binary between 
economic interests and censorship.291 If all that copyright cares about is 
whether a particular dispute can be assimilated to its traditional myth of 
economic incentives, then there is no reason to engage with—and 
distinguish between—the wide diversity of concerns coded into a 
copyrighted work.292 This laser-focused attention on markets may provide 
surface-level coherence to copyright law, but it both maps poorly onto 
                                                     
289. See Balganesh, Censorial Copyright, supra note 63, at 4 (“Publication, which for long had been seen 
as copyright’s principal analytical device for protection, is routinely conceived of in entirely commercial 
terms. In so doing, this exclusive focus on the commercial aspects of publication ignores the complex set of 
non-economic factors that motivate an individual’s decision of whether, when, and how to embrace the 
identity and title of ‘author’ . . . .”); cf. Patrick R. Goold, The Lost Tort of Moral Rights Invasion, 51 AKRON. 
L. REV. 51 (2017) (describing how copyright courts until the 1980s centuries often protected an author’s 
“moral rights” in attribution and the integrity of their work at first publication). 
290. See, e.g., Buccafusco & Fagundes, supra note 6, at 2452–53 (grouping together cases involving 
private letters, political rallies, “anti-Muslim rants,” angry widows, and family-friendly versions of films as 
“rooted in motivations unrelated to preserving owners’ financial interests in their works” and that may “tend 
to undermine copyright’s goal of optimizing creative production.”); Fromer, supra note 52, at 557–65 
(observing a similar grouping of cases as those where “the plaintiff appears to be interested in preventing 
the defendant from revealing, or at least further proliferating, information about him or her. The plaintiff 
does not seem to worry about being harmed in the marketplace for his or her copyrighted work, which is the 
utilitarian motivator for the copyright incentive.”); see generally Goldman & Silbey, supra note 51 
(critiquing both the suppression of negative business reviews and Cindy Garcia’s privacy interests as 
creating illegitimate “memory holes”). 
291. See, e.g., McIntyre, supra note 150, at 75 (“[T]here are cases in which the author is not at all 
concerned with the commercial value of his or her work . . . . In these ‘private censorship’ cases, 
copyright enforcement is far less compelling.”). 
292. See Chon, supra note 48, at 374–75 (“Under closer scrutiny, the analogy between the privacy 
interests of the NCP [nonconsensual pornography] victim and of those who might suppress valid 
dissent does not hold up. NCP is different from the other scenarios that Judge McKeown and Fromer 
rightly criticize, because of the pre-existing confidential, and indeed intimate, sexual relationship 
between two partners, and the desire of one of those partners to keep the work private pursuant to 
their original agreement.”). 
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copyright’s jurisprudential past and turns its back on the potential for 
copyright to address evolving social needs.293 
C. Structural Effects 
Third, by distinguishing between economic and personal interests, and 
delegitimizing the latter, copyright courts and scholars risk falling prey to 
a separate spheres ideology long critiqued by feminist scholars. Many 
areas of law have attempted to strictly separate the spheres of economic 
and intimate activity—e.g. contract law concerns business activity and 
domestic relations law deal with emotional support and caregiving. Legal 
scholars and economic sociologists have pushed back against this 
division, both empirically and normatively.294 Professor Viviana Zelizer’s 
body of work demonstrates that the supposedly hostile worlds of 
markets/money and intimacy/emotions just do not map onto the actual 
experience of either realm. Business relationships are deeply embroiled 
with emotional connections to coworkers and to the work itself, and 
intimate relations are often the subject of complex financial 
negotiations.295 
Moreover, by ignoring this real-world blending of economics and 
intimacy, and generally prioritizing economic over emotional concerns, 
various aspects of our legal system devalue and undercompensate harms 
experienced by women and other individuals with historically 
marginalized positions in the public sphere.296 For example, domestic 
                                                     
293. See Gilden, supra note 11, at 110. 
294. See, e.g., Jill E. Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491 (2005); 
Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Public Policing of Intimate Agreements, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 159, 
163 (2013) (“Family law scholars and legal historians have paid extensive attention to the courts’ 
refusal to bring contract law into the domestic sphere and this refusal’s historical effect of 
undervaluing the contributions of women.”); HENRIK HARTOG, SOMEDAY ALL THIS WILL BE YOURS: 
A HISTORY OF INHERITANCE AND OLD AGE (2012) (showing that family caregiving is often 
motivated by a mix of ethical, emotional, and material concerns). 
295. See generally VIVIANA ZELIZER, ECONOMIC LIVES: HOW CULTURE SHAPES THE ECONOMY 
(2010); VIVIANA ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY (2005); Martha Ertman, For Both Love and 
Money: Viviana Zelizer’s ‘The Purchase of Intimacy’, 34 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1017 (2009). 
296. See Hasday, supra note 294, at 517 (“[L]egal efforts to mark the specialness of intimate 
relationships by limiting or prohibiting economic exchange within them appear to have systematically 
adverse distributional consequences for women and poorer people, maintaining and increasing 
distributive inequality.”); Lucinda M. Finley, Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Reform for 
Women, 64 TENN. L. REV. 847, 854–55 (1997) (“The value judgments and assumptions fueling the 
attack on nonpecuniary loss damages are particularly problematic for women, because many aspects 
of women’s injuries are more likely to be redressed as nonpecuniary loss.”); Dan L. Burk, Feminism 
and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 183, 192 (2007) 
(“Dualism thus sets the stage for the supposedly inferior, feminized category to be given a status that 
allows domination and exploitation by members of the privileged category; it is a social and rhetorical 
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labor is rarely compensated,297 contractual relationships between men and 
women in intimate relationships are often circumscribed,298 and statutory 
limits on emotional distress damages disproportionately limit tort awards 
for women.299 Moreover, due to ongoing under-compensation and 
underrepresentation in wage labor, finance, and public sphere economic 
activities, women typically receive substantially less than men under 
standard techniques of measuring damages.300 By erecting a barrier 
between the economic and emotional arenas of life, and emphasizing the 
primacy of the economic sphere, the resulting doctrines in effect prioritize 
the needs of those individuals stereotypically associated with the 
economic sphere and turn their back on the needs of individuals 
stereotypically associated with the emotional.301 
Copyright law appears to share these priorities. Courts and scholars 
“casually regard[] copyright infringement as a mere economic injury with 
narrow moral valence,” ignoring the often complex psychological and 
social attachments surrounding a work.302 By only expressly recognizing 
an author’s economic interest in a work, copyright owners that are 
expressly driven by noncommercial interests are less able to invoke 
                                                     
strategy that ‘naturalizes domination.’” (quoting ROSEMARY RADFORD RUETHER, NEW WOMAN NEW 
EARTH: SEXIST IDEOLOGIES AND HUMAN LIBERATION 189 (Myra E. Barrer ed., 1975).)). 
297. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 294, at 518–19. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First 
Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 
(1994). 
298. See, e.g., Matsumura, supra note 294, at 177–78. 
299. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, 
and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1266 (2004) (“[J]uries consistently award women more in 
noneconomic loss damages than men, and that the noneconomic portion of women’s total damage 
awards is significantly greater than the percentage of men’s tort recoveries attributable to 
noneconomic damages. Consequently, any cap on noneconomic loss damages will deprive women of 
a much greater proportion and amount of a jury award than men.”). 
300. See Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 463, 464 (1998) (“Most empirical studies indicate that women of all races and minority men 
continue to receive significantly lower damage awards than white men in personal injury and 
wrongful death suits.”). 
301. Id. at 469 (“Emotional harm and nonpecuniary loss are devalued because of their cognitive 
association with women, and the harm that women suffer is more likely to fall into one of the 
disfavored ‘female’ categories. On a material level, operation of the vicious cycle thus perpetuates 
lower awards for women because their losses are more likely to rank lower on the hierarchy.”); see 
also Hila Keren, Valuing Emotions, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 829, 846 (2018) (“A vicious cycle has 
been created where emotional harms are undercompensated due to their association with women, and 
‘feminine’ injuries are in turn classified as emotional even when they have a salient physical aspect.”). 
302. See Buccafusco & Fagundes, supra note 6, at 2461. 
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copyright law to prevent the spread of a particular work.303 Although most 
authors are motivated at least in part by noneconomic concerns,304 women 
are likely disproportionately excluded by copyright’s market 
commitments.305 This is because women are disproportionately likely 
both to turn to copyright to combat revenge porn306 and to actively 
participate in noncommercial creative communities.307 If women 
copyright owners wish to protect their sexual autonomy or to prevent 
commercial exploitation of their work, they must try to engage in market 
gibberish and disingenuously recast their interests in commercial terms, 
or they must actually commercialize their work in order to earn the respect 
of copyright law. To the extent that copyright law pushes authors towards 
commerciality, it undermines the complex socioemotional incentives in 
many creative communities and potentially reduces the quality of work 
produced in these communities.308 For authors who cannot invoke the 
blessings of the marketplaces, the effect of a threshold market/nonmarket 
binary is that work by women, minorities, and other economically 
marginal groups are available for the taking, for free, for whatever reason, 
by financially powerful individuals and organizations.309 Whoever first 
                                                     
303. See Rothman, Commercial Speech, supra note 86, at 2005 (“[T]here is no justification for 
treating creators who do not wish to commercially profit from their works as second-class copyright 
citizens who should have fewer rights to control uses of their works.”). 
304. See, e.g., JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015). 
305. See generally Carys Craig, Reconstructing the Author-Self: Some Feminist Lessons for 
Copyright Law, 15 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 207 (2007); John Tehranian, Copyright’s Male 
Gaze: Authorship and Inequality in a Panoptic World, 41 HARV. J.L. & GENDER (forthcoming 2018). 
306. See, e.g., Danielle Citron & Mary A. Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 345 (2014). 
307. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender, and Fair Use in Copyright, 15 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 273, 301 (2007); Sonia K. Katyal, Performance, Property, and the 
Slashing of Gender in Fan Fiction, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 461, 468 (2006) (“Women 
have long been the dominant force behind fan fiction; like many types of creative work performed by 
women, their contributions are usually circulated among informal, decentralized, and largely 
unrecognized communities outside of the mainstream.”). Moreover, women were historically much 
less likely than men to own registered copyrights. See, e.g., Robert Brauneis & Dotan Oliar, An 
Empirical Study of the Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Age of Copyright Registrants, 86 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 46, 73 (2018) (“The most striking statistic about authors’ gender is that two-thirds of the 
authors in our study are male. At the same time, the data show a statistically significant time trend of 
increased female representation among authors of registered works.” (citations omitted)). 
308. See Rebecca Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent: Transformation in Practice, 31 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 497 (2008). 
309. Chon, supra note 48, at 376–77 (“Copyright’s other function to further Internet privacy is a 
response to this systematic valorization (and conversely devaluing) of certain legal and social 
categories. The assumptions that ‘progress’ can only be expressed through the smooth functioning of 
market mechanisms reinforces, and even magnifies, the structured nature of economic, gender and 
other forms of inequality.”); Tushnet, My Fair Ladies, supra note 266, at 291 (“Making fair game of 
 
07 - Gilden (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 10/21/2019  5:57 PM 
1070 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1019 
 
figures out how to make money off the images, texts, and sounds that 
circulate in our culture—be it Google, gossip magazines, Beyoncé, or 
Richard Prince—has free access to a vast swath of raw materials that other 
people care about deeply.310 
Looking back at the market gibberish cases through a gender-focused 
lens reveals several associations of legitimate market activities with male 
prerogatives and illegitimate personal interests with women. When J.D. 
Salinger seeks to protect his peculiarly strong desires for isolation, the 
Second Circuit makes sure to emphasize that this “highly regarded 
American novelist” was seeking to protect his “commercial interest”; the 
court was not seeking “to coddle artistic vanity or to protect secrecy, but 
to stimulate creation by protecting its rewards.”311 “Coddling” and 
“vanity”—two concepts stereotypically associated with women and 
motherhood—would undermine both the purposes of copyright law and, 
implicitly, the author’s masculine bona fides. Instead, copyright seeks to 
“stimulate creation”; in other words, copyright facilitates the potent 
virility of a great author. 
When an author seeks to stop the publication of private documents, 
they have expressly disavowed any intention to sell, courts nonetheless 
frequently say that the author nonetheless has “the right to change his 
mind” and make money off the work in the future. The key phrase is “the 
right to change his mind,” which is used in at least fifteen reported 
copyright decisions; by contrast, in no reported case has the court 
extended “the right to change her mind” to women plaintiffs and in only 
one case has a court extended “the right to change their mind” (to the 
husband/wife pair in Monge).312 Although the dominance of male 
pronouns in these cases may arguably be attributable to their historically 
default use, the total absence of female pronouns at least suggests a greater 
willingness for courts to see markets interests when men serve as 
copyright plaintiffs. Through market gibberish, male litigants can choose 
whether and when to reveal deeply intimate moments of their lives, and 
courts will provide both legal redress and rhetorical cover for their 
                                                     
women in public is part of patriarchy.”). See generally Julie Cohen, The Biopolitical Public Domain: 
The Legal Construction of the Surveillance Economy. PHIL. & TECH. 1 (2017) (“The information 
extracted from individuals plays an increasingly important role as raw material in the political 
economy of informational capitalism.”). 
310. See Andrew Gilden, Raw Materials and the Creative Process, 104 GEO. L.J. 355 (2016); 
Ertman, supra note 295, at 1030–31 (discussing Moore v. Regents of University of California and 
showing how anti-commodification concerns allowed for-profit researchers to have free access to 
Moore’s body). 
311. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 81 n.9 (2d Cir. 2010). 
312. Westlaw Boolean search, July 25, 2018, of “Federal Copyright Cases” database (on file with author). 
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vulnerability. By contrast, when copyright owners express concerns with 
“spiritual harm” or “emotional distress” or “mental anguish”—injuries 
again typically associated with women—courts not so subtly nudge 
plaintiffs to reframe their injuries in purely market terms.313 
Copyright’s market commitments—both doctrinal and scholarly—
create a false and unfair division between economic and emotional 
interests in creative works. As much as courts and scholars seek to neatly 
divide legitimate market interests from illegitimate personal interests, the 
world ultimately is just not structured according to this binary, and the 
market gibberish cases reveal just how easily markets and emotions bleed 
into each other. To the extent that courts and scholars really, really want 
to limit copyright to pecuniary incentives—some conceptual messiness be 
damned—the overall effect is likely to be highly regressive. Individuals 
and entities with wealth, fame, and a recognizable stake in the market can 
access the copyright system for a tremendous range of reasons, so long as 
they tell a good story about how a disliked use affects their bottom line. 
Others are simply shut out, even though copyright law is often well-
positioned to materially improve the lives of everyday people who create 
copyrighted works. Separating markets from emotions incentivizes 
market gibberish for those at the top, and leaves everyone else behind. 
III. FROM MARKET GIBBERISH TO INTEREST 
TRANSPARENCY 
As the previous Parts demonstrate, as much as copyright law tries to 
disclaim interests that are unrelated to an author’s economic interests in a 
work, it is in fact constantly confronting noneconomic interests and 
deciding when such interests are outweighed by some countervailing 
value in the defendant’s use. But because of copyright law’s resolute 
attachment to market rhetoric, courts are rarely transparent about how 
they are weighing the complex mix of economic, cultural, political, and 
emotional interests before them. 
This Article concludes with a modest proposal: quit the gibberish and 
show your cards. Rather than try to conjure a plausible market interest that 
would support infringement, or categorically exclude nonmarket interests 
when infringement seems like the wrong result, courts should expressly 
balance the policy concerns triggered by the defendants’ use under the 
four fair use factors and allow evidence of emotional and psychological 
harms for purposes of injunctive and monetary relief. If the alleged harm 
is economic, then the rigorous screening of market effects is entirely 
                                                     
313. See Smith v. NBC Universal, 524 F. Supp. 2d 315, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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appropriate. But if the alleged harm is noneconomic, then harm should be 
considered on its own merit and not in terms of whether it can be forced 
into a market framework. 
The following subsections discuss the statutory basis of this proposal 
and the merits of the proposal and concludes by addressing anticipated 
objections and areas for future research and refinement. 
A. Statutory Basis 
In previous work, I have demonstrated some comparative advantages 
of using copyright law to protect certain noneconomic interests compared 
with privacy torts, contracts, or criminal law.314 This Article emphasizes 
that such an approach is fully supported by the Copyright Act. There is 
nothing in the statute that forecloses express consideration of a plaintiff’s 
noneconomic interests; all arguments to the contrary are based upon 
policy-based concerns with censorship315 or an argument that the 
constitutional imperative “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the 
useful ArtsFalse”316 requires strictly adhering to the economic incentives 
theory discussed in Part I.317 Even if one strongly adheres to these 
understandings of the purposes of copyright law or disagrees with the 
normative thrust of this Article, such policy preferences are not rooted in 
the explicit text of the Copyright Act. The exclusive rights conferred by 
sections 102318 and 106319 state no limitations on the reasons why those 
rights may be asserted; they instead create entitlements with many of the 
qualities of a property right that, facially, may be asserted for any 
reason.320 
The most prominent limitation on the rights conferred by the Copyright 
Act is the fair use doctrine. Codified in section 107, the fair use doctrine 
also does not require courts to consider only economic harms. Section 107 
                                                     
314. See Gilden, supra note 11. 
315. See, e.g., McKeown, supra note 49. 
316. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
317. See Goldman & Silbey, supra note 51, at 9–10. 
318. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, 
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly 
or with the aid of a machine or device.”). 
319. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002) (providing the owner of copyright the exclusive rights to 
reproduce, prepare derivative works of, distribute, publicly perform, publicly display, and perform by 
digital audio transmission). 
320. See also 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (1978) (“The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in 
whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will 
or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.”). 
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requires courts to consider four factors, on a case-by-case basis, to 
determine whether a disputed use furthers an important policy goal of 
copyright.321 None of the four factors set forth in the statute precludes 
consideration of noneconomic interests, and none of the decisions above 
point to the text of the Copyright Act as supporting a substantive barrier 
to entry for privacy-seeking plaintiffs like Cindy Garcia and Hulk Hogan. 
The second fair use factor—“the nature of the copyrighted work”—can 
easily encompass the emotional and/or economic nature of the author’s 
investment in a work. As mentioned above, courts frequently address 
whether a work has been previously published under this factor, and the 
Supreme Court in Harper & Row expressly pulled from common law 
privacy concerns when addressing an author’s right to control first 
publication.322 Although courts have squeezed a variety of different types 
of work into the category of “unpublished,” there is nothing in the text of 
the statute that forecloses court from expressly considering a broader set 
of attributes.323 Courts might ask whether the work was created in a sexual 
context, whether the work was secretly recorded, whether it contains 
private information, whether the work was inherited from the original 
author, or what if any financial resources were expended in its creation. 
Asking these questions would greatly illuminate the “nature” of the 
allegedly infringed work and transparently tee up the interests that the 
court is ultimately balancing. 
The fourth fair use factor, which prompts courts to consider “the effect 
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” 
also places no such limit on considering noneconomic harms.324 Even 
though the fourth fair use factor is often shorthanded as the “market harm” 
factor,325 “market” and “value” are stated in the disjunctive, meaning that 
a use can be assessed in terms of its impact within the marketplace or upon 
some other set of “values.” A few courts have acknowledged this 
disjunction in dicta—that “[t]he statute by its terms is not limited to 
market effect but includes also ‘the effect of the use on the value of the 
                                                     
321. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (“The fair use doctrine 
thus ‘permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on 
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.’”(alterations in 
original) (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 2017, 236 (1990)). 
322. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554 (1985) (“It is true that 
common-law copyright was often enlisted in the service of personal privacy.”). 
323. Cf. Goldman & Silbey, supra note 51, at 54 (observing that the “second fair use factor—
typically given little love in fair use analyses—has a much more significant role to play when 
copyright claims implicate privacy concerns”). 
324. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (emphasis added). 
325. See Fagundes, supra note 8. 
 
07 - Gilden (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 10/21/2019  5:57 PM 
1074 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1019 
 
copyrighted work.’”326 Moreover, the Supreme Court has expressly 
opened the door to this inquiry. It noted in Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc 327: 
The copyright law does not require a copyright owner to charge a 
fee for the use of his works, and as this record clearly 
demonstrates, the owner of a copyright may well have economic 
or noneconomic reasons for permitting certain kinds of copying 
to occur without receiving direct compensation from the copier.328 
Although the Court in other cases has emphasized the economic 
incentive of copyright, both case law and statute permit courts to expressly 
consider the noneconomic impact of putative fair uses. 
And finally, the remedies provisions of the Copyright Act place no 
limitation on considering noneconomic injuries. With respect to 
injunctive relief, section 502 empowers courts to “grant temporary and 
final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or 
restrain infringement of a copyright.”329 With respect to damages, section 
504 provides that the “copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual 
damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement” as well as 
“any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and 
are not taken into account in computing the actual damages.”330 “Profits” 
are almost certainly measured in terms of dollars,331 but “actual damages” 
need not be.332 Moreover, in lieu of actual damages and profits, the 
copyright owner may elect for statutory damages in an amount “the court 
                                                     
326. Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(emphasis in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(4)). As discussed above, however, the court 
nonetheless proceeded to immediately engage in market gibberish as to the plaintiff’s market interest 
in deciding when if ever to release its founder’s racist texts. See also Soc’y of the Holy Transfiguration 
Monastery v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29, 64 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Archbishop argues that the Monastery 
has not shown specific lost sales or profits as a result of the alleged infringement. But the fourth factor 
of the fair use inquiry cannot be reduced to strictly monetary terms. Statutory law expressly states that 
it considers not only the impact of a work’s use on the potential market, but also its effect on the 
‘value of the copyrighted work.’” (emphasis in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(4))). 
327. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
328. Id., at 446 n.28 (emphasis added). 
329. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). 
330. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). 
331. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1404 (10th Ed. 2014) (defining “profit” as “[t]he excess of 
revenues over expenditures in a business transaction”). 
332. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 471 (10th Ed. 2014) (defining “actual damages” as “[a]n amount 
awarded to a complainant to compensate for a proven injury or loss”); see also Smith v. NBC 
Universal, No. 06 CIV. 5350(SAS), 2008 WL 483604, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2008) (“Section 504 
of the Copyright Act employs the term ‘actual damages,’ and ‘[c]ourts and commentators agree it 
should be broadly construed to favor victims of infringement.’” (quoting On Davis v. The Gap, 246 
F.3d 152, 164 (2d Cir. 2001))). 
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considers just” within a proscribed range.333 The Ninth Circuit has 
justified—albeit in a cursory manner—its ban on emotional distress 
damages because such damages would be too “subjective.”334 Even if this 
is a valid policy limitation on redressing noneconomic injury in copyright, 
its nonetheless a limitation without any express anchor in the governing 
statute. 
B. Merits 
A more explicit weighing of the parties’ economic and noneconomic 
interests in the disputed use would greatly improve the quality of fair use 
jurisprudence. Several scholars have recently emphasized the need for a 
more “behaviorally realistic” account of copyright litigation,335 but doing 
so requires cutting through the gibberish.336 Copyright law desperately 
needs an expanded vocabulary to capture why authors create works, why 
copyright owners litigate, and how copying affects others. In the past two 
decades, copyright law has made great strides in articulating the range of 
interests and values implicated by the defendant’s use of a copyrighted 
work. In the growing taxonomy of “transformative” uses,337 courts have 
recognized that unauthorized copying can provide important social 
commentary,338 parody a well-known work,339 facilitate internet 
research,340 and greatly enhance scholarly and historical works.341 
Scholars have further emphasized the autonomy-enhancing, identity-
developing, and community-building work that unauthorized copying can 
                                                     
333. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). 
334. See Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F.3d 909, 917 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Although it is not hard to be 
sympathetic to his concerns, the market value approach is an objective, not a subjective, analysis. 
Consequently, Mackie’s subjective view, which really boils down to ‘hurt feelings’ over the nature 
of the infringement, has no place in this calculus.”). 
335. See Buccafusco & Fagundes, supra note 6, at 2483. 
336. Cf. Adam J. Kolber, Supreme Judicial Bullshit, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 141, 175 (2018) (“[T]he joint 
opinion [in Casey] fills the void with strategic bullshit: the authors wax philosophical even when the 
content of their message is unclear, argue that stare decisis ties their hands, cloak their line drawing 
with a non-existent justification, and try to seem more principled than perhaps they really are.”). 
337. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009). 
338. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006). 
339. See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003). 
340. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Authors Guild, Inc. 
v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). 
341. Bill Graham Archives; SOFA Entertainment, Inc. v. Dodger Productions, 709 F.3d 1273 (9th 
Cir. 2013). 
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facilitate.342 
The market gibberish cases show a need to develop a similarly rich 
taxonomy of interests on the plaintiff’s side. Copyright owners do 
sometimes invoke copyright to squelch criticism or protect their business 
interests, but they also do so to fortify their sexual autonomy, protect their 
privacy, and continue bonds with deceased relatives.343 Copyright of 
course is not, and should not be, the only area of law that addresses 
privacy, autonomy, and familial bonds, but—as I have spelled out more 
extensively in previous work—it can provide a useful supplement to tort 
and criminal law.344 Copyright often can provide more robust protections 
for plaintiffs than privacy torts, without forcing individuals to turn to law 
enforcement in order to shore up the vulnerabilities that can emanate from 
the dissemination of a copyrighted work.345 
The only potential place, however, within the current fair use 
framework for plaintiffs to explicitly slot these interests is under the 
category of unpublished works. The greater protection for unpublished 
works reflects the variety of economic and emotional interests that 
justified a common law right to control first publication; these 
justifications included the author’s privacy.346 As discussed above, 
“unpublished” overly conflates a range of very different economic and 
personal interests.347 If courts were to expressly consider economic and 
noneconomic investments in copyrighted works throughout the fair use 
analysis, copyright jurisprudence could accurately and honestly recognize 
the interests that it is being asked to juggle. Recognizing that plaintiffs’ 
noneconomic interests exist does not mean that they win the day; it simply 
allows them to be on the playing field. And, most importantly, it clarifies 
the normative work that copyright law is already doing. 
There are a few good examples of courts engaging in such open, 
transparent balancing of interests. As discussed above, the Lerma Court, 
when denying a preliminary injunction against the Washington Post, 
expressly balanced the Scientology Church’s desire to prevent “spiritual 
harm” and limit the spread of secret texts against the Post’s interest in 
                                                     
342. See, e.g., Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 463 (2010); Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Everyone’s A Superhero: A 
Cultural Theory of Mary Sue Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 597 (2007); Katyal, supra 
note 266. 
343. See Gilden, supra note 11. 
344. See id. 
345. Id. 
346. See generally Balganesh, Censorial Copyright, supra note 63. 
347. See supra notes 283–292 and accompanying text. 
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reporting on an ongoing controversy between the Church and its former 
members.348 The court held that our constitutional commitments to free 
press and separation of church and state militated against civil liability for 
the Post. Another district court presiding over a related Scientology 
dispute similarly was willing to openly balance the interests at stake—a 
very weak claim to economic harm and a religious interest that was 
outweighed by interests in free speech. In Religious Tech. Ctr. v. 
F.A.C.T.net, Inc.,349 the court stated, clearly and emphatically, “RTC 
effectively requests that I advance its religion at the expense of 
Defendants’ lawful rights to use the materials for the purposes of criticism 
and research. The United States Constitution, common law and the 
Copyright Act preclude me from doing so.”350 
The Eleventh Circuit in Katz v. Google351 openly recognized that the 
plaintiff was suing for copyright infringement in order to stop the spread 
of an unflattering photograph of him by an outspoken critic of his business 
practices: 
Katz profoundly distastes the Photo and seeks to extinguish, for 
all time, the dissemination of his “embarrassing” 
countenance . . . While we recognize that even an author who 
disavows any intention to publish his work “has the right to 
change his mind,” the likelihood of Katz changing his mind about 
the Photo is . . . incredibly remote.352 
The court acknowledged the interests motivating the litigation, 
acknowledged the plaintiff’s efforts at market gibberish, and found no 
sufficient policy basis for infringement. Because the courts in the three 
above examples openly weighed the noneconomic interests of the 
plaintiffs against the free speech interests of the defendant, these cases 
help piece together a hierarchy of personal interests and free speech values 
within fair use. 
Missing from fair use cases, however, is an explanation of when and 
why, in cases like Monge, Peter Letterese & Associates, and Henley, 
copyright interests outweigh free speech interests. Copyright case law 
contains many specific examples of free speech expressly outweighing 
noneconomic interests, but why do the noneconomic interests underlying 
market gibberish outweigh free speech in so many cases? Is it because of 
the acute privacy concerns? Because there really is a concern with market 
                                                     
348. See supra notes 174–176 and accompanying text. 
349. 901 F. Supp. 1519 (D. Colo. 1995). 
350. Id. at 1527. 
351. Katz v. Google Inc., 802 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2015). 
352. Id. at 1184 (citations omitted).  
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substitution? Because of some bad faith activity, such as theft? Answering 
these questions would be extremely useful for clarifying how copyright 
law—with its diverse mix of economic and emotional investments—fits 
into the larger constellation of First Amendment law. For example, are 
privacy assertions in copyright subject to the stringent constitutional 
limits on other privacy-motivated lawsuits, as shown in cases such as The 
Florida Star v. B.J.F.353 or Snyder v. Phelps?354 Or is copyright law, with 
its express footing in the original articles of the constitution, somehow 
different, as suggested by the Supreme Court in Eldred and Golan?355 
Regardless of whether one believes that copyright needs to be 
substantially constrained due to its potential for censorship, or one 
supports a more robust copyright system, the current system would benefit 
greatly from increased transparency. By avoiding express engagement 
with noneconomic interests, current fair use law is opaque, inconsistent, 
and de facto prioritizes the interests of powerful market actors. 
Expressly considering the full range of economic and noneconomic 
interests would also much better align copyright infringement with an 
appropriate remedy. As discussed above, courts continue to regularly 
provide injunctive relief for copyright infringement, even though the 
supposedly economic interests underlying copyright infringement would 
seem much better suited to purely monetary relief.356 By allowing 
                                                     
353. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (holding that the First Amendment prohibited 
liability for a newspaper for publishing the name of a sexual assault victim); see also Bohannan, 
Harmless Speech, supra note 8, at 1156 (“If First Amendment concerns are weighty enough to prevent 
courts and legislatures from presuming harm to privacy from the publication of a rape victim’s name, 
then surely courts should not presume similar harm from the copying of copyrighted material.”). 
354. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 456 (2011) (“Westboro’s choice to convey its views in 
conjunction with Matthew Snyder’s funeral made the expression of those views particularly hurtful 
to many, especially to Matthew’s father. The record makes clear that the applicable legal term—
'emotional distress’—fails to capture fully the anguish Westboro’s choice added to Mr. Snyder’s 
already incalculable grief. But Westboro conducted its picketing peacefully on matters of public 
concern at a public place adjacent to a public street. Such space occupies a ‘special position in terms 
of First Amendment protection.’” (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983))). 
355. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (“The Copyright Clause and First Amendment 
were adopted close in time. This proximity indicates that, in the Framers’ view, copyright’s limited 
monopolies are compatible with free speech principles.”); Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 327–28 
(2012) (“Concerning the First Amendment, we recognized that some restriction on expression is the 
inherent and intended effect of every grant of copyright.”); see also JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE 
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD 143 (2018) (“[A]lthough the 
Supreme Court has never explicitly said so, it has repeatedly indicated that First Amendment defenses 
have less traction against IP claims.”). 
356. See Jiarui Liu, Copyright Injunctions After eBay: An Empirical Study, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 215 (2012) (“One might imagine that the unequivocal teaching in eBay might have had a 
significant impact on the way that lower courts adjudicated copyright injunctions. The empirical 
evidence suggests otherwise.” (citations omitted)). 
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prevailing copyright owners to spell out their noneconomic interests 
during both liability and remedies phases of litigation, courts could better 
tailor injunctive relief to the scenarios where it gets at the plaintiff’s 
underlying concerns—for example, to stop the spread of a sex tape—and 
to deny it when the plaintiff’s sole interest is in getting paid.357 Mark 
Lemley has argued that copyright law too often conflates a rightsholder’s 
interests in “compensation” and “control,”358 and this tendency to conflate 
makes sense in a system that provides a highly truncated account of why 
a copyright owner might legitimately want to control a work’s 
dissemination. 
In an interest-transparent copyright system, rightsholders can obtain 
monetary relief (beyond baseline statutory damages) if they can establish 
foreseeable harm to actual licensing prospects—precisely the approach 
previous scholars have advocated.359 However, if they can establish a 
credible harm to interests that have nothing to do with compensation—
and that those harms outweigh the defendant’s and public’s interests in 
accessing the work—then injunctive relief may better respond to the needs 
to the prevailing plaintiff.360 Importantly, injunctive relief does not 
necessarily mean a complete restraint on the work’s dissemination—for 
example, it could entail redaction (e.g., if plaintiff seeks to protect 
privacy) or require attribution (if plaintiff seeks recognition).361 
Moreover, although injunctive relief in copyright law is often associated 
with concerns about prior restraints on speech,362 in many circumstances 
                                                     
357. See Orit F. Afori, Flexible Remedies as a Means to Counteract Failures in Copyright Law, 29 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 45–46 (2011) (“The way to resolve this problem is by introducing 
flexible remedies, determined on case by case, which would permit courts to balance the conflicting 
interests inherent in copyright law, reflecting both the need to protect owners’ interests and the public 
interest in enabling greater use of copyrighted works.”). 
358. Lemley, supra note 19, at 191–96. 
359. See supra notes 260–266 and accompanying text; see also Lemley, supra note 19, at 195 
(“Licensing-market cases are one circumstance in which it seems to make sense to provide 
compensation but no control.”). 
360. Id. at 194 (“Copyright owners occasionally make claims that invoke an interest in control but 
not compensation. The easiest such example is attribution as the author of a work . . . If we truly think 
of these as moral rather than economic rights, the right remedy is not to compensate the copyright 
owner for their loss but to ensure that they retain some control over the use of their work.”). 
361. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 
1797–98 (2012) (arguing that authors may value attribution more highly than pecuniary rights and 
that attribution rights could be cheap to implement); Buccafusco & Fagundes, supra note 6, at 2495 
(“[W]hen the nature of the harm comes from diminished creative incentives associated with the failure 
to provide attribution to the author, courts could impose injunctive relief mandating that all 
subsequent copies of a work include appropriate attribution.”). 
362. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual 
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998). 
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a targeted injunction may have a less substantial impact on the defendant 
than potentially crippling damages award.363 An interest-transparent 
approach would shift attention away from disingenuous pecuniary 
interests and focus on ways to actually and directly remedy the harms that 
can accompany the loss of control. 
C. Potential Roadblocks 
There are three likely objections to courts explicitly considering the full 
range of a copyright owner’s economic and noneconomic interests. This 
subsection addresses each in turn. 
The first objection is that by opening the doors of copyright law 
expressly to noneconomic interests, copyright protections will overly 
expand and trample on the free speech interests of downstream users. This 
is one of the primary concerns of previous scholars who have focused on 
plaintiffs asserting non-traditional motivations—by entertaining 
emotional or dignitary concerns, courts may distort the copyright system 
and further enable rightsholders to stop critical, unflattering, or 
journalistic uses of their work.364 
An interest-transparent approach does not, however, necessarily lead to 
a significant retrenchment of free speech; in fact, it may rein in censorship 
through copyright.365 In the examples above where courts have been 
transparent about the plaintiff’s motivations—Lerma II, F.A.C.T.net, and 
Katz—the courts rejected the plaintiffs’ interests in light of overriding 
policy commitments to research, criticism, and free speech. By expressly 
acknowledging the interests at stake, these courts were able to avoid the 
trap of market gibberish and refused to conjure some loss to a potential 
market. The problem in many of the cases above, and what often leads to 
an overly expansive copyright system, is not the noneconomic motivation, 
but the ability of powerful rightsholders to use gibberish to expand into 
speculative, disingenuous markets. And if one of the reasons that courts 
speculate about markets is to vindicate privacy or dignitary interests for 
certain sympathetic plaintiffs, like Bret Michaels or Monge & Reynoso, 
an interest-transparent approach would remove the incentive to 
manipulate markets to such an end. Courts could engage with these 
sympathetic interests more directly and expressly. This analytical shift 
would not necessarily change the ultimate results in cases like Bond, 
Garcia, and Bollea; in each of those cases there were other obstacles—
                                                     
363. Gilden, supra note 236, at 1173–74 (2013). 
364. See, e.g., McKeown, supra note 49, at 1; Fromer, supra note 52, at 563–64, 587.  
365. See Buccafusco & Fagundes, supra note 6, at 2481 (arguing that recognizing the 
“heterogenous motives” of authors will better enable courts to achieve the consequentialist goals). 
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child welfare, highly questionable ownership claims, and news reporting 
interests—that may have doomed the copyright claims. However, by 
knocking out plaintiffs’ claims in these cases because they invoked 
privacy, courts also knock out noneconomic claims—such as in revenge 
porn cases—that are less likely to significantly disrupt free speech 
ecosystems while meaningfully protecting vulnerable individuals.366 
The second objection is that by allowing judges to acknowledge and 
balance the full range of parties’ interests, the infringement inquiry 
becomes unconstrained and overly subjective. Nonetheless, the cases 
above demonstrate that the infringement inquiry—and particularly fair 
use—is already highly subjective; courts are reaching highly divergent 
results when confronted with similar issues in different cases. This is in 
large part unavoidable when operating pursuant to a fair use statute that 
mandates case-by-case balancing of multiple open-ended factors.367 
Moreover, numerous scholars and judges have pointed out the inevitably 
subjective nature of a body of law that requires assessing whether two 
works are sufficiently similar to impose infringement.368 The line between 
infringing and non-infringing in many cases is just not susceptible to a 
crystal clear rule, meaning that judges and juries are going to inevitably 
be forced to rely on their intuitions and common sense to resolve a 
dispute.369 If courts are going to engage in a deeply subjective endeavor, 
                                                     
366. See Chon, supra note 48, at 377 (“[T]he privacy concerns expressed by plaintiffs in 
[nonconsensual pornography] cases can be accommodated with little distortion, either to copyright 
first principles, or to First Amendment concerns.”). 
367. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (“In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include . . . . [four fair use factors]”); Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (“Section 107 requires a case-
by-case determination whether a particular use is fair, and the statute notes four nonexclusive factors 
to be considered.”). 
368. See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (“Nobody has 
ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.”); Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 
OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 63 (2012) (“Although market effect has the ring of an objective factual investigation, 
it is in fact a highly subjective assessment.”); Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion 
of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 605 (2001) (“The fair-use doctrine of American 
copyright law has been derided as among the most hopelessly vague of legal standards, requiring 
complex and often subjective interpretation.”); Stacey M. Lantagne, Sherlock Holmes and the Case 
of the Lucrative Fandom: Recognizing the Economic Power of Fanworks and Reimagining Fair Use 
in Copyright, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 263, 297 (2015) (“The malleability of the 
transformative use factor contributes to the problem of courts relying on their personal aesthetic 
judgments. The transformative use factor has developed in such a way as to force works into narrow 
categories, shoehorning what could be cultural dialogue into preexisting expectations.”). 
369. See, e.g., Zahr K. Said, Reforming Copyright Interpretation, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469 (2015); Robert 
K. Walker & Ben DePoorter, Unavoidable Aesthetic Judgments in Copyright Law: A Community of Practice 
Standard, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 343 (2015); Christine H. Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805 (2005); Alfred 
C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247 (1998). 
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influenced by a wide variety of considerations, those considerations 
should at least be allowed to come to the surface. 
The third likely objection is that noneconomic injuries will be too hard 
to quantify, too easy to manufacture, and too uncertain to be workable. 
These arguments, however, have all been raised and frequently contested 
in the context of emotional distress damages generally. For example, tort 
reform initiatives designed to reduce wasteful or abusive litigation have 
often sought to limit emotional distress damages out of a fear that they are 
too easy to falsify and too hard to reduce to a monetary award.370 In 
response, several legal scholars have argued that (1) emotional distress 
damages are not necessarily any more uncertain than often highly 
speculative consequential pecuniary damages371 and (2) this skepticism 
structurally hurts women, racial minorities, and the poor, who lack the 
earning potential of other groups and organizations.372 An interest-
transparent approach sends a message that noneconomic injuries are 
neither less important nor less credible than the economic injuries asserted 
by traditional copyright owners. If anything, the market gibberish cases 
demonstrate the need for courts to carefully scrutinize both economic and 
noneconomic injuries before determining liability and the remedies that 
follow. 
An interest-transparent approach shines a light on what policy 
questions are actually being considered in copyright litigation and helps 
level the playing field for the wildly diverse set of individuals and 
institutions who hold copyrights. The long-term question for future courts 
and scholars is where each particular interest fits into the hierarchy of 
                                                     
370. See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and 
Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 912 (1989) (“Whatever the categories of non-economic damages 
allowed in a given jurisdiction, the law provides no objective benchmarks for valuing them.”); Jeffrey 
O’Connell, A “Neo No-Fault” Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident Guarantees of Postaccident 
Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 898, 899 (1985) (“Like establishing fault, translating a 
noneconomic loss such as pain into dollars is an extremely uncertain process fraught with large 
transaction costs. Highly emotional evidence and arguments are at a premium as both sides try to win 
the sympathies of the jurors.” (citations omitted)); Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional 
Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936). 
371. See Finley, Female Trouble, supra note 296, at 852–53; Ira M. Ellman & Stephen D. 
Sugarman, Spousal Emotional Abuse as a Tort?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1268, 1298–301 (1996). 
372. See Chamallas, supra note 300, at 499 (“My hypothesis is that legal claims for emotional 
distress have been devalued in part because they are associated with female plaintiffs. In a less biased, 
more inclusive tort system, claims for damage to emotions and relationships would not be viewed 
either as property rights or commodities, on the one hand, or as lacking in value, on the other.”); 
Finley, Female Trouble, supra note 296, at 854 (“When tort law favors market-referenced damages 
over the nonpecuniary, it is also reinforcing the discriminatory valuations of the market and 
entrenching the tendency for higher income white males to receive better results in the tort system 
than people of color, women, and the poor.”). 
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values confronted by the copyright system. By avoiding direct 
engagement with the full range of copyright interest, market gibberish has 
made it exceedingly difficult to even begin such a project. An interest-
transparent approach pushes copyright law to better assess and explain its 
underlying value system. 
CONCLUSION 
Copyright is not, and never has been, entirely about money.373 The 
images, texts, and sounds covered by this area of law are the repositories 
of a rich mix of psychological, cultural, and financial investments, and the 
dissemination of a copyrighted work inevitably implicates the economic 
and personal interests of authors, subjects, and audiences. Copyright law 
claims to slice away emotions from economics in creative works, and to 
concern itself solely with the latter. But a large body of case law reveals 
that copyright does not practice what it preaches. As much as courts 
purport to screen out noneconomic interests from the copyright system, in 
actuality they do no such thing. Instead, they use the rhetoric of markets 
to protect the noneconomic interests of copyright owners who can 
plausibly tell a story about market harm. This Article has shown that 
doubling down on copyright’s traditional market-based rationale 
primarily claws back copyright protections for those on the margins and 
can actually enhance the ability of copyright to do the bidding of its most 
powerful rightsholders. This approach is opaque, inconsistent, and leaves 
far too many people behind. Copyright law has the potential to serve a 
broad range of rightsholders: wealthy, poor, celebrities, aspirants, and all 
gender identities. To do so fairly and effectively, however, courts must be 
far more explicit and transparent about what underlies the disputes that 
come before them. 
 
                                                     
373. See Chon, supra note 48, at 366 (“If we limit our understanding of legitimate goals of 
copyright protection to market actors or commercial ends, we are missing a lot of the copyright story, 
past and especially present.”). 
